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1. INTRODUCTION
1) FoLLowing the approvaI by the CounciL of Ministers in 1978 of a
priority programme for civiL aviation the Commission pubLished in 1979 its
memorandum on 1'Contributions of the European Communities to the DeveLopment
of Air Transpoft Services". In this memorandum the Commission concLuded wjth
respect to scheduLed air fares that aLthough the situation is compLex there
'is "scope for improvement and that it is time for a rethinking of the tariff
st ructure".
This idea has been strong[y supported by the European ParIiament and
by many other parties.
2> The United Kingdom presented in 1980 to the CounciL of Ministers a
working paper on passenger air fares in the EEC which set in motion certain
events. This resuLted in June 1980 in the CounciI taking the fotLowing
decision:
" Having taken note of the views on passenger air fares expressed in
the Commissionrs Memorandum on the contribution of the European Communities
to the development of air transport serv'ices,
- recognizes that the subject of scheduLed passenger air fares in the
Community is worthy of comprehensive study, and
invites the Commission, in coLLaboration with nat'ionaL experts, to
examine the various scheduLed passenger air faires charged in the
Community, in the Iight of the work being carried on, amongst others,
by the European CiviL Aviation Conference, tak'ing particuLar account
of:
- the economic constraints on airlines,
- the present conditions of their access to the market, and
- the effect of non-scheduLed passenger air fares,
with a view to informing the CounciI of the resuLts of its examina-
tion as soon as possibLe."
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D This is the hackgrouyri for the present report on the exarninati-on of
sche,,lule,l pass,anger ai-r fares i-n the community. this examination cloes not inclu"{e
any examination of the conilitions of nrarket access although these form an essen-
tial backgrounl to 1;he circurnstances in whj-ch air fares are fixei*' 1{or does
this report examlne the cornpatj-bi1i'r,y of'the present metho;is of fixing air'
fares v,ii-th . the EIiC T',rea'ty, lthicir r,rill fonn the subject of further conBide-
rations. 1,lre repor'; can threlefore be saiil to consist of an exaJ0inaJion of'
the actual levels of air fares pai.d i-n accor'iance with the present arranS;e-
ments.
il Any exarninat:Lon of air fares nust take into accoult the responsibil'ities;
a.nj objecti-ves of g<lvernments anci interests anC objectives of airlines ancL
users an:l must also have regarrl to tiie interests of air transport employees
anc travel agents. .ae.ch of these groups has i-ts own opinion as to the characterrs-
tics air faresr ough't to have. Government responsibilities and objectives are
expresse,l by 1aw in many Member States but have otherwise been communlcated
to the Cornmissron b,y the lviember States . 1']re other groups have been consulteci
throu-g'h their orgafli.sations cocperating with the cornrnission' As a result of
these consulteiti-ons it became clear vrhicir aspec'bs of air fares sirould be
incfurlef ii: tlre examination.'rhis j-s fu.rther explained in chapter 2'
5) For the exa$ination as such the Connmission has taken into acco*nt
stud.ies and. analyses whlch have already been caffj-ed outr e.c. by ECAC'
bcisting information, however, seldom relates to the cornrnunity dj'rectly
and. 1t has therefore been necessary to collect further infomation and to
reassess existing studles (see for cietails par. 3?).
1) fhe Conrnissionf s apProach
has been to descrlbe the present regulatory system tri-th respect to air fares'
to fook at the air fares and. econonic consequences which result fron this
system and to exa.r0ine the air fares wlth a view to the varj-ous aspects which
interest the different groups. The exanination, whi-ch has been nacle with the
help of national experts I airns to be factuaf and objective in order to cr'eatb
a found-aiion for Conmission proposals and. Councj.l decisions in this area'
It shoul-d. be notecl in this context that the provisions of the Rone
Treaty may have an irnportantbearing on such proposals and/or decisions.
t( see seconC iniient of the Councilrs invitation.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1. The process of fixing scheduLed passenger a.ir fares
8) Fares charged by the airtines for scheduled passenger air services
are a resu[t of air[ine and government activities. The first stages
invoLve mostLy airLines individuaLLy and/or coILectiveLy whiLe governments
ptay a decisive role in the finaL stages.
9) The IegaL framework for tariff setting is constituted by nationaL
civiI aviation [aws and regutations, bitateraI agreements and in particu-
Lar the internationaI agreement of 1967 on the procedure for the esta-
btishment of tariffs for scheduLed air services, which was estabLished
by ECAC and pubLished by ICA0. Although not aLL Community Member States
have ratified this agreement it is in pract'ice being foLtowed by aLL.
10) The nationat civit
domestic and internationaL,
government approvaL before
may be given in writing but
considered given after the
aviation rules speci fy that ai rLines, both
must present their tariffs and obtain
they become vaIid. The government approvaI
provi si ons a Lso ex'ist, whereby approval j-s
expi ry of a ce rta'i n period" .
11) These rules are supplemented by biLateral agreements and in most
cases the 1967 internationaI agreement. In fact since with respect to
air fares the 1967 agreement in generaL repLaces the biLateraL agreements,
only the 1967 agreement wiLL be discussed here. The pertinent ruLes are
found in articte Z)paragraphs 3 to 6:
tr(5) The tariffs referred to'in paragraph 2 of this ArticLe shaLL, if
possib[e, be agreed by the air[ines concerned of both parties, after
consuLtation with the other airLines operating over the who[e or part
of the route, and such agreement sha[1, wherever poss'ibLe, be reached
by the use of the procedures of the InternationaL Air Transrrort Asso-
ciation for the working out of tariffs.
(4) The tariffs so agreed shail. be submitted for the approval of the
aeronauticaI authorities of both Parties at least njnety days before
the proposed date of their introductjon" In speciaL cases, this period
may be reduced, subject to the agreement of the said authoritjes.
(5) This approvaL may be given express[y. If
authorities has expressed disapprovaL within
of submission, in accordance with paragraph 4
tariffs shaLL be considered as approved. In
submission being reduced, as provided for in
authorities may agree that the period t.lithin
be notified shaLL be Less than thirty days."
neither of the aeronauticaL
thi rty days from the date
of this ArticIe, these
the event of the perio,d for
paragraph 4, the aeronrauti ca L
whjch any disapprovaL must
?(6) If a tariff cannot be agreed in accordance with paragraph 3 of this
ArticLe, or if, during the period appLjcabLe in accordance with
paragraph 5 of this ArticLe, one aeronauticaL authority gives the other
..aeronauticaL authority notice of its disapprovaI of any tariff agrered int
accordance with the prov'isions of paragraph 3, the aeronautjcaL
authorities of the two Parties shaLL, after consuLtation with the
aeronauticaL authorities of any other State whose advioe they consider
usefuL, endeavour to determ'ine the tariff by mutuaL agreement."
1 Z> In addition to this, there are procedureaL provisions in cas;e of
confLict between States.
As a resuLt of biLateraLs and the muLtiLateraL agreement 1
confidentiaL arrangements and agreed practices airLines are in practice
expected to propose tariffs themseLves and then discuss them with other
airLines operating on the same route with a vieul to agreelng on comlnon
proposaLs to the governments invoLved. In some instances airLjnes do
taLk to their oLrn government before they start consuLtations with other
airLines. These consuLtations should if possibLe take pLace at IATA,, but do
not necessari[y d.o so. Consultation between the airlines operating on
the same routes 'is possibte. However, in practice it has often happened
that some governments are unfavourabLy disposed to tariff proposaLs if
they have not gone through the IATA consuLtation-
13) When airLine consuLtation has been finished, a'irLines then
propose tariffs to the governments involved. It has been indicated to
the Commission that the governments of aLL Member States in fact fer:L
respons'ibLe for the tariffs charged, but that they as far as possibLe
keep apart from the actuaL tariff negociation. Some Memb". 51319s do2
however, specify generaL objectjves for tariffs.
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In practice, most governments refuse to approve fares ulhich its
olrn a'irLines do not agree with- From evidence supplied to the Commission
this seems to have [ed to a situation where airLines are often not able
to irnplement quiokly their ot.tn commerciaL judgement, e.g. in cases where
airLines see possibiLities to open up new markets or in cases of fast
rising costs
2.2. Government criteria
14) GuideLines for tari ff approvaL by the nationaL administrations
'Law, reguLations and practice and in the 1967are to be found in nationaL
Internationa L Agreement
The nationaL criteria have been indicated to the Commission by
the Member States and are found in Annex 1.
15) The 1967 agreement incLudes criteria for fares approvaL in articLe
2 paragraph 2 :
"(?) The tariffs to be charged by the airlines of one Party for carriage
rfto or from the territory of the other Party shaLL be estabLished at
"reasonabLe LeveLs, due regard being pa'id to aLL reLevant factors,
"incLuding cost of operation, reasonable profit, and the tariffs of
a'other ai rIines,"
16) The three criteria in the 1967 agreement are also to be found
in most nationaL criteria, but may be expressed in a different way. In
addition a number of other criteria are mentioned either by one or more
Member States. The foLLowing criteria are mentioned either in the 1967
agreement or in national LegfsLation on other nationaL measures of MemberStates as indi cated:1. Reasonable relationship to costs (*) (967, B, DK, F, NL, UK, D, GR,
rRL. )
2. Reasonable prof it (967 , B, DK, F, NL, lJK, D, GR, IRL. )
3. Tariffs of other airlines (967, B, DK, F, NL, D, GR, IRL).
4. No predatory effect (IRL, F, D).
5. In the jnterest of the consumers (GR, DK, F, NL, UK, D, I )
6. In the interest of the carriers (DK, F, NL, UK, D, I).
7. ComparabLe fares over the same distances (F).
8. NationaI interest (UK, D).
(*) In spme countries it is stipuLated that it shouLd be the costs of
effi ci ent operators.
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The flollowing section will d.escribe to what extent these
national criteria were reinforced. by the consuftations with
relevant otgantzations.
2.3. 0ther evaLuation aspects
17) As well as goverltments, the users of airline services, the
airLines themseLves airline ernployees and travel agents are interested
in air fares, but the criteria whereby they evaluate then nay d.iffer
from the crjteria used by governments or at Least they may emphasize
different aspects.
IB) During a number of hearings the Commission lras presented vith the
views of :
- Air Transport Users Committee (AUC), (UK)
- Consumers ConsuLtative Committee (CCC), (EEC)
- Conference of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCCI), (EEC)
- Association of European AirIines (AEA), (Europe)
- Independant Air Carriers of the European Community (ACE), (EEC)
- Transport I'lorkers Unions (Tl.tU), (EEC)
- Groupe of NationaL TraveL Agents Association (NTAA), (EEC)-
Apart from oraL presentations by these organizations the Commission
atso received 3 written statements. These statements are attached ,as annex
?, 3 and 4.
19) It wouLd be'impossib[e to include a fuLL account of the hearings so
the foLtowjng shouLd be seen onLy as a summary. For ease of presentation
the pertinent comments have been indicated with respect to each criteria
as Listed on page5. It wiLI a[so be seen that additionaI criteria have
been added.
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I . Xeesgngble_relatlonship to_oosts
20)This criterion was supported. by everybod.y. an inportant d.iscussron, however,
took place on what cost basis should. be used.
AEJI pointed' to the very conplex nature of the issue a.nd. stated.:
trThere nust be indeed such a reasonable relation between costs a.nd.
fares as a general objective. Orr the other hand., cost allocations
are an extrenely oomplex subject a,nd. nany arbitrary erenents are
inevitably involved in a cost allocation to routes. problens at that
'etage sufficiently underline the extrene difficulties which would
arise in a cost alloeation aocord.ing to traffic category and. fare
type. There also remains to d.efine what a representative cost would"
be on a specific route since the cost level on a4)r given route varies
between the ind.ivid.ual operators. This is for instance, a factor
which has been fully acknowledged in the ECAC study of European alr
'faresr which notes that to a very great d.egree operating costs are
a reflection of the respective national situations. Given the great
differences encountered. by the airlines themselves in cost allocations,
a strict ad.herence to a theoretical cost formula, the purpose of r.rhich
should enable authorities to assess nathenatically the d.egree of
relationship between fares and oosts, can in fact be defined as a
very ambitj.ous target of spurious accuracy.rr
and further:
I'Apart fron technical argtrnents, we have to stress the fact that
operators have to }ook, not only at the operating costs in isolation,
but at the cost of senrlcing all segrnents of the air market.rr
21, ACE stated:
'rA reasonable relationship to the cost of operations is the primary
criterion for evaluating faresr ed should always be obsenred. bearing
'in mind the costs of an effioient carrier. Since nail and cargo in
most cases can be camied in ad.dition to a normal load. of passengers,
the cost criteria should be based on normal-loarl passeng€r flights
onlyr and the revenues fron mail and cargo consid.ered an ad.d.itional
contribution. This will nake fare comparisons possible between carriers
that carry d.iffering loads of nail and cargo or no mail/cargo at al1.rl
8-
and further:
"In the absence of free market conditions'in Europe, the predominant on-demand
fare type (in Europe normaLLy the economy-cLass fare) shouLd be Linked cLoseLy
to the costs of an efficient air carrielin po'int-to-point terms."
ZZ> The argument about using an efficient air carrier's cost Level as a
basis was supported strongly by AUC. This organization jn fact h,as trying to
construct the cost Level of a simulated efficient UK air carrier. 'this cost
Level would be used by AUC as a basis for their air fare evaLuationr;. AUC
acknowledged that the probLem was more compLicated in the Community where the
cost Levets may differ between airLines of different nationality serrv'ing the
same route.
Hotueveq some users, and espec'iaLLy the CCCI emphasized the importance
of fulL fare faciLities and the existence of secondary and tertiary routes;
they felt that fares shouLd be reLated more to the economic conditions on a
whote network and not necessari [y only on the routes concerned.
2. Reasonabte profit
23> This oriterion was also recognized as a prereguisite for a satis.factory
system of air transport in the Community.
As a target percentage
excLuding financiaL charges is
charges wouLd demand another 4
fact not the case at present.
AEA c Lai med that 8 % prof i t over tot;a L costs
needed for the industry. The financiaL
% profit. AEA mentioned that this wias'in
This wiLL be demonstrated in Chapter 3.
2Q The transport workers strongly underLined the criterion of reasonabLe
profit. They were of the opinion that a sound financiaL situation for the
airLines t.louLd produce stabLe and otherwise satisfactory conditions for the
workers.
Further more ACE stated :
"We can only re-iterate our view that European air transportation should be
managed as a normaL "for profit" business concern, with investment:s obtained
through the normaL free-market financiaL means. Any aspects of th,: business
considered a "pubLic servi ce obL'igation" shouLd be accounted for sr:parateLy
and subsidi sed separateLy i f absoLuteLy necessary."
)-
3 . Tali f f s gf_olher_qi.!i n"t
25) This criterion which would caLL for aL'ignment of air fares, was not
reatLy commented on except by the NTAA who said that if there was not some
sort of coordination the resuLt wouLd be an unmanageabLy Large number of
fares. This t^rouLd be non-transparent and very difficuLt for the users.
4 . No_predalo ry_elf s c!
?O A general definition of this concept does not exist. if fares are cost
reLated then this evaLuation tnlouLd not be necessary. The Commission regards
it as being synonyrnus with whether tariffs haveacharacter of dump'ing or not.
5, !n_the_interests_of the users
27) This criterion was supported by everybody ard is implicite[y covered
by the criteri a 1, 7, 9 and 10*.
6. !n_the_interests_of the cagi ers_
2U This criterion was a[so acknowledged by everybody. In this context
the CCC and CCCI mentioned that this shouLd not Lead to a subsidized air
transport system. The ai r carriers naking reasonabLe profits shouLd be abLe
to operate as commerciaL undertakings, be'ing abLe to make decisions on
market conduct on a cornmerciaL basis. ImpIic'itLy this cr"iterion is covered
by the criteri a 1, 2, 3 and 4.
7. ComparahrLe fares over the same distances
29) This is one of the cLassicaL aspects of air fares whjch many
parties use as a yardstick.
However, as ACE said:
"If fares are reLated to point-to-point costs of an effic'ient carrier, as
this Association is recommend'ing, they wi LL automaticaLLy become cLoseLy
re Lated to di stance" .
Thi s poi nt of vi ew i s to some extent not shared by AEA t"hi ch
points to [arge variations in costs. NevertheLess, they stated:
* see page 1 1
R_'t0
$There is :Ln fact a reasonable overall relation between fares and
d.istance. The overall correlation between fares and stage d.istance
is, as we pointed out in our own examination referred to abover (1)
higher than that betvteen costs and di.stance. This is certainly
a d.emonstration of the success of multi-lateral tariff-coordlnation
in srooothang o'rt not only inequalities between fares for adjacent
routes, brrt also some of the large variations j-n costs.tr
National_ilterest: '-fhis oriterion dlci not give rise to separate analys.is.
In ad.clition to the abovementi-oned criteria a few others were ment:ioneJ.
/n\ 
-
4 !"grl la$g of_products\ z /_( Ciroi.ce )
30) For the users, the airfares should refl-ect the needs of the
d.j-fferent i;1'oups of users. In order to cover these needs the users
advocate a broad range of products so that they can have a choice.
There were users who advocateC a low basic fare plus extra
paynents for additional serwices they nlght want. The CCCI on the
other hand. undertined the interest in the present economy type fare.
This s;eems to lead towartls a requirement for a broad range of
fares i This; was acknowledged. by the airline and travel agents.
31) In this context ACE stated:
"!rie should perhaps encourage the Comrnj-ssion, on thj-s guestion of
relating fares to services ren,lered by the airline, to d.evote time
lo consi-delring ways in whlah airllnes could practi.cally separate
the aopecl; of an air ticket frorn the aspect of a seat reservationl
with a view to treatlng the latter as a non-refundable option. Such
a fundamental change to the basis of European on-demand air transport
sould have profound effects upon the evolution of European air
transport,,tt
32) while AEA claimed
'rRegarding the overbooklng problern, 1t i-s certainly an oversimplifi.-
cation to believe that the problem can be solved by charging
directly llor the cost of reservation. Let us repeat once nore that
the overbooking guestion is directly related to the fno-showl
problern, anrt that both the travelling publi.c and the intermediaries
are the major culpri.ts in thi.s respect. Overbookingr which is
strj-ctly controlled by the ainlines, is a way of overcoming the
tno-show r problen,rr
(1) AEA : "Air fares in Europe"(2) 
"Producttr is used in this report in the sense of a
service offered on particu,L.ar conditions.
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10. lrgngngrgngv_ancl-sirngllflcgtgog
33) It was clai.med fron many sid.es that passengers should not pay for costs
they d.o not incur a,nd for services they d.o not want. At any rate they want
to know what exactly they are paying for. For that reason products need to
be sinple and understandable.
NTAA stated that travel agents see their comrnercial interest in serving
the public and conseguently their evaluation of the air fares is practically
sinilar to the evaluation of the users. They too aclvocate sirnple, transparent
ancl und.erstandable products; they realize, however, that such a demand calls
for a linitation of the number of prod.ucts that can be available per route.
2.4.Description of the ensuing exanination
34) To what extent the present scheduled passenger air fares in the Community
reflect the criteria mentioned in paragraphs 14 
- 33 is examined. in chapter l
of this report. Given the proced.ures for fare approval by governments and the
opinions of the organisations consulted it seems logical to eoncentrate the
examination on the following areass Related criteria
aE numhered_ in
a) wtrat is the profit level of airlines operations in the Yar'z! - '33
Corunrnity and on individual routes? I , 2 , 6
t) fs there sufficient choice and. transparency?
c) Are fares related. to the services offered?
a) Wfrat is the cost relationship of fares?
e) Are air fares related to distance?
f) fs air tra,nsport in the Comnunity cost effective?
o ln/ t -"
)rLv
it tr,1r/
I
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35) The first step will therefore be to show revenue arrived at by
the airlines selling al1 their services - clefined as all revenue derived fron
intra-Cornnunity traffic traveling at the whole raJrge of existing fares - and
to what ertent this is related to the costs of production (par.38 - 44).
Thereafter attention will be paid to the profitability of individual
routes (par. 45 - 5o).
Before looking at the relation of the ind.ividual. fare t;pes and their costs it
is necessa,ry trr looL at first at these faras rrd their neLatedl .conditions.The:rdf,ore
chapter 3 will as a next step treat the structure of fares in the intra-
copnunity network and a.nalyse the existing choise for the consumers ancl tire
tra&sparency of that choiser lI in other words whether the userg can actually
-L2-
understand. the existing choice of fares with all their related" cond'itions
(po. 5I - 66)
36) Thereafter it wiLl be examinecl to what ertent lndlividtual fare types are
rel,ated to the coste of operation and how far such a relationshlp is
cornpatible with a relationship between fares and distance. A relatect problen
is the fact that the airlines yieltl per fare type is often less 't;han
the actuaL fare qrroted (p"t. 57 ' 9B).
Finally chapter l, wiJ.J. look into the matter of cost efficiency sincer
a situation without any excess profit may well be conbinecl with airLi:ne costs
which are higher than they woulct be under a nore cornpatitive reginer as i.t
was claimecl by sone of the organisations consulted..(ear. 99 - LLil '
3?) As statecl in the introduction of this paper, the najor part of these items
have already been the subject of stucly by other bodies, the results of the
following stud.ies have been evaluated by the Comrnission and are reflected- in
this report:
Conplenentarity of Competition between scheduLed. and non-sched.uled
air transport (rter 1975)
European Air Fares (lUC f9?e and suppLement 1980)
European Air Fares (caa fgZZ)
Air Fares in Europe (lng fgff)
E\rropean Air Fares (House of Lords fgBO)
Drtch Cascade study (m fgZg)
Report on intra-European air fares (ncec 1981)
The economic cost gtructure of air transport in Europe (faf fgSO)
AEAI Sales costs, a comperative examination between AEA and US
Airlines
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3. ITTE EJUM]NATION OF AIR FANES
3.1. ProfitabiIity of the Community network
i. 9suea$gsn-e!-9v9te!!-lgysns9-s!g-!g!s!-e,et!s
38) SeveraL studies have been conducted jn the past that
devoted attentjon to the profitabiIity of the LocaL European
scheduLed operations. ALthough these operations cover more coun-
trjes than the European Community aLone,
the concLusions reached for Europe as a whoLe wiLL probabLy in
princ'ipLe not differ from the concLusions that wouLd be achieved
on the basis of data from the Community alone.
39) There are three bodies coLLecting evidence reguLarLy
concerning the profitabiLity of European services. These are :
1) The InternationaI Civit Aviation 0rganisation (ICA0),
2) The Association of European AirLines (AEA) and
3) The IATA Cost Committee.
The fottowing text includes only the main etements of
these statistics. A more exhaustive description has been made by
ECAC in its study on intra-European ai:c faresrwhich incLudes an
'inventory of the various sources of evidence.
40) ICA0 issues a yearLy pubIication "Reg'ionaL differences in
fares, rates and costs fon internationaL air transport" in which
the revenue/cost ratio for locat Europe*can be found. These ratios
wene for the years '1975-1978 : 1OO, 125, 110 and 115x*.
According to thejr figures Europe has the highest revenue/cost
ratio of the 12 regions investigated in the uorld. (Average for alt
regi-ons t9?B = 101).
However the figures pubLished by ICAO are critjcized by
European AjrLjnes as weLL as by governments because the ICAO method
of aLtocating indirect costs to the European servjces seems to under-
estjmate the totaL cost LeveL and aLso the method to derive the figures
seems to [ack consjstency from one year to the other.0n the other hand
ICAO figures do not contain an aL[owance for incidentaL revenues which
wou[d add some percentage points to the ratios. The totaI effect seems
to be an overestimation of operating resu[ts for LocaI Europe.
* See definition of frlocal Europerr in
** Revenue cost ra+i^ 
- 
Total- revenueTT'IGETE-
annex J, Glossary of Terms.
x 100
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11) The average operating ratios calcuLated by AEA for AEA airLitres for
the years 1975-1979 are 106 .1 , 108.7, 108.01105.3 and 1O5-7. These ratios do not
include financiaL charges which amount to 4 percentage points. These resutts
Lead AEA to the concLusion that profits for LocaL Europe are too Lowfor any
of the five financiaL years. To iLLustrate this further AEA derived an
"economic cost ratio"; a ratio of 100 indicates a situation where the airtines
can meet financiaL expenses, pay dividends and taxes and repLace aircraft at
current prices. For the financiaL year 1978/79 this ratio was 95.9.
4D In october 1980 the firm of consuLtants "Transportation AnaL)rsis
InternationaL" (TAI) presented its finaL neport on the study "The ecotromic
cost structure of air transport in Europe" which was carrjed out for tlhe
Commission.
The 1978 resuLts for 15 AEA airLines h/ere as foLLows:
TabLe 1 : Operating results in LocaL Europe f or 15 AEA scheduLed a'irL'ines
Number of RirLines % operating (*) resuLt
a
1
5
I
:4
4
I
11-15%
6-10%
1- 5%
1-10%
I
I
I
iI
+ prof it
- Loss
(*) Profit or Loss as a 7' of totaL operat'ing costs before
i nterest exPenses .
These 15 AEA airLines, of which 10 are Community based, account for
93.17" of the RTK's * of scheduLed operations performed in locaL Europe by
AEA airLines.
13) As stated in the table the operating results r^rere calculated excLuding
interest expenses as they !€re not suppLied by the AEA. The TAI report concLuded
that the AEA airLines as a group did not achieve an acceptabLe profit marg'in
for LocaL Europe scheduted passenger operations. The consuLtant took as a
bmis for that concLusion that the airLines m:st achieve a "clear and s'ignificart
profil" sven and above totaL operating costs and interest expenses in order to be
* RTK = Revenue Tonne Kilometres
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able to re-equip with new generation aircraft. This conclusion of
course depends to a certain extent on the financial year which is
chosen for the analysis
However, the find.ings of the TAf report
are simitar to the ECAC conctusions where the ECAC study conctuded
that "if European scheduLed fares are found to be generaLLy too
high, it is not because airLines are earning high profits from the
region taken as a whole and taken one year brith another",
It shouLd however be observed that these concLusions are based
on information provided by AEA airIines and fotLows
therefore from the usuaL AEA cost attocation method
and as shown by the differences between ICAO and AEA operating
ratios the catcuIations are very sensitive to cost aI tocation between
Europe and other reg'ions in the worLd. No information is avaiLabLe
to iILustrate this probIem satisfactorily.
44> To the Commission it seems that in general it can agree
with the conc[usion of ECAC provided the cost attocation of AEA
airlines is not biased against loca1 Fqrope. At a71y rate even the
IcAo"ratlos d.o not constitute exessive profits. ft seems also likety
that a few airlines are able to obtain satisfactory operating ratiosin Europe.
'l'1. g,gsecri:g!-91-rev9!s9-s!d-s,99!: 9!-s-P9r-rgs!9-!3!i.9
45) After the anaLysis in the preceeding paragraphs the LogicaL
next step is to Look at profitabiLity on individuaL routes. Two
sources of evidence may be quoted in this respect :
First there is the AEA, "Air faresin Europe study" where passenger
operating ratios (1) are caLcuLated for a sample of 84 routesrof
which 57 re[ate to EEC airLines. The average passenger operating
ratio was 101.5 with a minimum ratio of 59.7 and a maximum of 163.6.
A table from the study is repnoduced in table 2 and it may be seen that
there'is a very wide variation. The actual Load faotors vary from 30.8
to 78.1 add the breakeven load.factss vary from 39,1 to 84.2.
(1) The passenger operating ratio is the reLationship between passenger
revenues and the passenger reLated operating expenses (incLuding
financ'iaL charges). An operating ratio of 100 indicates that the
airIine has achieved the break-even Foint which does not include
any profit margin.
(2)
Range lland(xos )
Actual Pax
laad Factor ( %)
Ilreakeven Pax
Load !'actor (%) Pax op€rating ltilLlo
Min. Av. Max. Min. Av. llax. Min. Ilax.
2oo - 199
400 - 599
600 - 799
800 - 999
roo0 - rL99
r2oo - rl99
r4oo - 1599
|6(t1t - t7<).)
r t{100
lo.8
42.O
42.4
)).o
t{8.9
5r. r
49.5
45.t1
60-.7
,9.2
53.6
55.4
60.7
62.9
59. I
6t+ -2
72.5
78. r
65.1
7 ).'
68 .2
68 .8
6,..8
72.2
{o.6
5l. B
40..z
)9. I
4r.l
40. r
ArJ.2
l9 .6
66 
"7
65.6
tJ.6
50. ,r
)>. >
5r.o
47.)
62.r
82.9
8{.2
6?..5
,9.5
/'*. )
6r.?
)).'l
g".u
59.7
69.7
7\-tr
7 ).9
77.9
9{. rt
rll.o
88. r
9r.o
90. l
loo. o
ro9.9
ro9. l
r2l.l
l2{ .9
rol.4
r l?.6 |
I
r l0.i 
Irrr.e 
It:)q.8 
II'J7.{l l
t()7.tl
t6t.6
Ljc).()
Total eample(8{ routea ) lo. I 50. r 78. r )9. I 59.2 8{.2 59.7 r()I.5 l6 3.6
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TABLE 2 - LoAD FACTORS AND OPERATIMG RATI0 B-Y R4116E BANq- lli7t
Source : AEA "Air fares in EuroPe"
Source: AliA routo! from aamole.
Notor:- thG avcrago refers to th€ welghted av€rag€ for tho corre$pon(l.Lug
range band;
- 
tllnlmum or nraximum rater of an actual and breakeven load factot.s
and operating ratio do not necessarily refer to tlle larne l-oute r
- 
breakevon load factora and operatlng ration inclrtdc an
allowanco of ).78% of total co!t for financial clrdrgos.
40 The AEA study also produced figures -
concerning the same 84 routes - with respect to individuaL
airLines and those figures ane reproduced in tab[e 3'
47> As may be seen from tabLe 3 'important differences in
route profi tabi l'i ty can exi st even wi thi n one ai r L i ne '
Furthermore it is interesting to see that high costs (carrier D)
do not necessariLy mean Low profits as those costs may b€r
compensatedbyevenhighery.ieLdsandreaSonabLeLoadfactors.
ALso Low yieLds (carrier C) may be compensated by even Lower
costs and h'igh Load factors ' Another exampLe 'is set by ai r-
Line (M) with higher than average yieLds, Lower than avel.age costS
but yet through a much tower than average Load factor 1t still
makes a Loss on its four routes incLuded in the study'
48)ThisevidenceShows-foraLLairlinesandaLLroutes-
that there are important differences in profitabi Lity per route
and a Lso that ||,i th'in an ai r L i ne some routes do c ross-sub:ii di ze
other routes. In the commission's opinion some cross-subsidiza-
tion is onLy naturaI and refLects normaL commerciaL prac'!ice'
-u-
However, on some routes the high level of profits may in fact be so high
as to violate criteria 1 anil 2 (reasonable relationship to costs and.
reasonable profits) and qn6y6s also art. 86 of the Treaty. This 1s
even more so since 1!ll was a rather poor year for aviation. or the
other hand some of the deficj_ts are so high that the fares nay be
predatory (criterion {), unless there i-s e.g. a public service
obligation (criterion B).
-raBlEl--:-r.NDIcEs 0F Ec0Notilrc pERF0RMANcE By cARRTERs (1925)
. Source : AEA "Ai. fa.e
Source: AEA routes from rafiplc.
'Cost and yield indicer compare the average co3t and yield achieved by caclr carrier yith tbc
correlponding cost and yield for eguivalent diltance! derivcd from the regres!ion analyai3
of the aample data.
Thc indcx for the cott! 6hd yi.elda dcrlvcd fror regrcerlon analytit 1. cquol to l(X).
49) It 'i s argued by many ai.tines. that one shouLd r.ook at
the totaI neth,ork of the airtine. Thihnei routes are bound to
be tess viabte than routes ,uith dense traffic flows. Even if
a thin route does not cover the fulI costs - incLuding ovenheads -
aILocated to that route, the route may stiLL contr-ibute to the
airLiners profitabiLity by generating revenue in excess of the
di rect costs.
50) such position leads the commission to the concLusion that
the revenue on each route should at [east cover variabte route
costs and give some contribution to the airtiners fixed costs,
otherwise criterion 4 wouId realty be viotated. Moreover the number
of routes of the eaae airline not covering the total costs (fixect,and
variable) should be strlctly linited, for only if the proportlon of
routes not c6vering their total costs is relatively sna11 one coulcl
argue that narginal oosting is accepta_ble for those routqs.
r) see also pagc {8
Carrier
Av. route
di! tance(kos)
Carri er I s
Colt
Index.
Carrier I s
YioId
Inder'
Av. Par
',oadFac tor
Av. par
operr ti ng
Ratio
Dassenger operating Ratio To tal
number of
routel< 99.9 roo-to7.g > loB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
il
I
J
l(
L
lt
r690
rr47
qr9
66J
6to
59,{
r(75
tolS
50'
592
970
t,7r
tro
72
8l
?4
ro5
82
ro5
97
r18
96
r16
roB
r21
80
lol
94
7O
ro{
98
r.o6
9O
8Z
8S
94
8{
lol
ro9
52.2
6r.)
75.2
58.6
\).?
50.4
6L.5
66.j
56.9
56.r
60. tl
60.2
{r.q
116. tr
r4t.6
r2r. ,
rr{.{
ro9.5
ro2.9
ror.B
roo.9
94.6
91.8
92.5
9L.2
8 j.8
I
I
I
7
t
5
lo
9
)
{
4
lNo. of routes
I
2
I
2
2
2
I
I
2
{
2
2
I
4
I
I
:
2
5
{
{
2
t2
{
9
rl
r6
4
5
4
ve rage,/
Total 686 60.1 rot.7 4B l2 2\ 84
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3.2. The Structure of fares
51) Fgr air travel a Large number of different scheduled fare types and
associated conditions exist. A difference can be made betueen fares which are
directLy avaiLabte to the pubLjc and fares t.lhich are only avajtab[e for tour
operators as a basis for the construction of inctusive-tour packages;l the
Latter fare types are catled Inclusive Tour (IT) basing fares.
For fares directLy available to the pubLic, ujthin the Community, abotrt 150'
different rutes* exjst and one of these ruLes aLways appLies to some or arrother
of those fares.
In princ'iple these conditions as expressed in the ruLe contain certain Iim'itations
with respect to the use of those fares by the travetLing pubLic. Such Limitations
contajn in genera[ ruLes uith respect to:
- the vaLidity period of the ticket
' the length of stay at the destjnation point (or points)
'the fLexibjlity of booking
- the f Lex jbi Li ty of routi ng
- the possibi Lities of naking stop-overs
- the group size
- discounts for spouse, chitdren, students, etc. and djscounts for tourguides
- the capaciiy whjch the ajrljnes make avaj[able for a fare type or a route.
The aim of Louer fare types is to increase the totaL traffic t'otume and
the ajrLjnes average Load factor nhich improves the econonics of the route,, in
principle at the benefit of aLt passenger categories fLying on that route. The
major ajm of the [imitations in this respect is to prevent too many passen.qers from
shifting from the hjgh yielding fares to the Lower fares, thus mainta:ining for the
ai rLines an acceptabLe average yjeLd LeveL.i. 9beigs-e!-leri.Ils
52) For the examination of choice the Commission Looked at the tariffs
ava'i[abLe on 550** direct intra-Community routes. The decision of whether a
tariff was available was taken nerely on the bases of a tariff being prublished and
For some tariffs on some routes the capacity the air[ines make avail.abte for sold'
that tarjff js extremeLy Limited, but these capacity timitations have not been
taken into account-
In atlt1ition to the number of tariffs available there is also a systern of discounts
for specific groups of travellers, i-.e. spouse, youth, workers, etc. llhese dls-
copnts apply to some but by no neans to all tariffs publioly available, - As
example (Brussels-Athens),is shown in aru:ex B. In the following analysris th,ese
piscounts have not been included.
numbered. in 1;he ApT
J-anuary 1, 1981 
- 
mles suoh. as /'
corrnted as two routes
* Source3 Airline Passenger Tarlff nr.8J1
** Exa.roplel London-Faris, Paris-London was
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As a first step table 4 gives information on the number of tariffs
avaitabLe on January 1r 1981, on the diffenent routes. rhe first cLass
tariffs have been excLuded and aLso a tarjff with different LeveLs according
to the season has for the sake of this anatysis been counted as only one
t ari ff. Furthermore, the ana Lys'i s did not inc Luded the c Lub c Lass t ari ff
which llas onLy introduced recentLy and avaiLabiLity at the first months
of 1981 was Limited.
TabLe 4: Number of tariffs per route
of Routes Number (*) of tariffsavai IabLe
7
IY
32
30
4
1
2
3
4
5
6 or more
100:l
(*) Not 'inc Luded f i r"$
6lass and seasonal
di fferences nor
discounts
Number of routes: 550.
53) From this table it may be seen that on 26% of the routes (43 routes)
the passenger onLy tinds one tariff (i.e. near[y always the expensive normaI
econorry tariff) - or th/o tariffs; the second tariff is in most cases an
"Excursion fare" which is the second highest revenue fare after the normaL
economy fare. At the other end of the scaLe there are 66 routes (2y.) which
offer the passenger a choice of 5 or more tariffs.
54) The passenger's prime interest is that he should be abLe to buy a
product that suits his demand at the Lowest possibLe pnice.
The products as they exist at present represent in most insiances
a combination of features which the passenger can either buy in totaL or
not at alL; these products are generaLLy indicated as "bundLed" fares
in contrast to "unbundLed" fares which g'ive the passenger the option to buy
onLy those eLements he needs.
-- 
\))) rn
a)
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,irhese elements besides the transportation itself are, interlining, proratrng
for multisectgr routes, nileage deviation, extra mileage rules, s€€;t rel;er-
vation, no show, ability to charrge reservationsr possibility of reroutilrgt
refuntling of patrrrnents and. catering.
principle there are three groups of conditions:
conditions that eliminate some or more of the above rnent'ione'l
elemerrts, thus giving a cost saving to the airlines I
conditions that allow the airli-nes to control their passienger
flow and thereby increase the passenger load. factor thusr red:rclng
costs per passenger seat soldl
c) conditions that are meant to prevent a shift of passengerrs from
higher fares to lower fares.
The prj-ce d.ifferential is guite often much larger than the cost san'ing
resulting from the relevant condi.tion. Group c conditions do not iricur
any cost effects.
56) In the Commissionrs opinion group c conditions and limitatj-ons that
are only meant to segment the market ancl to give the airllnes a possibility
to nake use of differences in price elasticity of different user g]:oups do
not constj-tute essentially different products.
OnIy group a an.l b comtitions which are meant to help the airline to in'crease
its seat factor through a better management of its passenger flow, or which
are base,l on cost differences, \io constitute essentially different products.
The availability of a certain number of d.ifferent fare types on a l:oute
therefore .loes not yet mean that the passenger has a choice that meets his
Cemancl un.ler d.ifferent circumstances. The availability of a number of f ower
fare types only ind.icates that there are possibilities for the passengers
to travel at less than the full nornal economy fare if the passenger is
prepared to accept the relate.I oond.itions.
57) The second. step in the examination was to discover how cheap a
passenger can really travel if he j-s prepared to comply entirely to arqr
limitations that the airline would impose on hin. The relative figures are
produced in table ).
o)
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Table 5: The Lowest generaL* avajLable fare as a Z of Normal Economy (NY)
't ExcLuding spouse, students, etc.
** Less than the 7 t in tab[e 1 as there are some routes without the
NormaL Economy fare
Number of routes 550
58) As may be seen from tabLe 5 there stiLL is an important number of
routes uhere tariffs do not exlst which are base{. on a high utilisation
and low eeat acoess. This in spite of, the fact that oharter airlines
generally are excluded fron operating on routes wlth goheduled, traffio.
Ctassification of fare types
59) For the further anaLyses of this chapter the different intra-
Community air fares have been grouped into five different fare types
based on the existing associated ruIes and restrictions.
1) The NormaL Economy fare
This fare type*, the highest fare after first class, offers the
passengers the full flexibllity of rerouting, stop-oversl rosor\r'&-
tions, lnterllning, etc. The fare a,lso offers ma.rci-mum seat accessi-
bility.
x Recently the slightly higher club class fare has been introduced../.
This fare type is, however, not included in this analysis.
z of Routes The Lowest avai LabLe
fare as Z of NY
0n
is
the
47 i( of the routes there
no tariff of about haLf
normaI cconomy tariff.
**6.3
1.7
3.5
19.0
16.5
100 %
100-802
80 - 70 "/"70-60t
60-552
26.4
14.5
7.0
5.1
55-502
50-45'{
45-407([ess than 40 Z
0n 53 % of the routes there
are tariffs of about half
or less tha^n half the normal
economy tariff
100 z
3)
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2) Excursion fare
This fare sti LL contains eLements of f lex jbi Lity ; it is generat t.y
bookabLe at short notice. The major feature is that the passenger is
ob[iged not to return before the week-end after his departure or that
he is obliged to stay at his destination during a certain number of days.
For aLL fare types Lower than normaL economy there are generaL[y no
one tray tickets avaiLable so a passenger is obLiged to buy a return ticket.
SpeciaL Excursion fares
Usually nore limitations are imposed. on this fare type than
on the Excursjon fare. The most important features, on top of the
Limitations on the Excursion fare, are often that the outbound and
inbound journey must be booked and the ticket must be paid at the momernt
of ticket purchase. Changes in reservations are generaLLy not possibte
and often Limitations exist with respect to routing and stop-over
facilities.
Apex (advance purchase excursion) fares
In addition to the SpeciaI Excursion fares conditions these tickets must
be purchased and paid a certain time before the journey commences and
possibiLities for refunds in cases of cancellation are strictly l:Lnited.
The capacity offered on a route for Special Eccursion fares as well aet Apex
fares ig somet'imes Limrited to certain fLights or to a smatL numher o,f
seats per fLight. ALso these Latter tuo fares are sometimes only
avaiLable for a minimum group size traveLling together.
The Logic in this structure is that, go'ing f rom fare type 1 to 4 :seat
access reduces,thus making it possibLe for the air Line to increa:;e its
seat factor by attracting net.t passengers at the Lower price bracket
of the market and by a better control of the booking pos'ition on the
route.
5) I.T. basing fare
A fifth fare type which exists is the earLier mentioned IT basing fare.
This fare 'is not a fare which the consumer rril-l f ind advertised or can
buy for "travet on[y". The fare is a price the airL'ines ask fronn a
tour operator who uses the fare for the travel part of an incLusive
tour package which be seLLs to the generaL pubLic. Very often, h<lwever,
the IT basing fares have additionaL Limjtation simiLar to the excursion
and apex f,ares.
4>
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Aygr!ebr!rlx-e!-lcre-lyps:
60) Table 6 shows in how far each different fare type is avaiLable on
the 550 i nt ra-Commun'ity routes.
TabLe 6 : AvaiLabiLity of fare types
NormaL Economy
Excursion fare
IT fare
SpeciaL excursion fare
Apex fare
* There are indeed a very few routes with onLy excursion fares and no
normaL economy.
The most generaLLy avai Lable are the ri,ormaL economy fare and the excursion
fare but also on many routes the rT fare exists. rt appeared that the IT
fare does exist on many routes where there are no other Lower fare types
avaiLabLe' The differences in avaitabiLity of fare types per route are
mainLy caused by differences in market conditions on those routes.
Ibs-!sye!-el-Jerss-!y- ssqpe ri:e!_!1.!h_egrsc!_eselesr_ Jeres
61) TabLe 7 g'ives the percentage of the normaL economy fare that the
passenger must pay for each different fare type on the different routes.
Table 7 : % of NormaL economy fare, per fare type and per route
t of aLL 550 routes
gg %*
73%
67 7"
27%
12%
% of routes Pri ce 
"fot Norma Ieconomy fareExcursion fare Apex fare IT fa re
0
15.9
38.0
?4.9
7.0
12.9
1.3
0
0
0
31 .3
25.9
29.9
11 .5
1.4
0
0
0
0
30.2
14.3
11.1
25.4
6.3
12.7
0
0.5
7.7
22.2
17.8
7.?.2
16.2
E.5
4.9
100 z
100-802
80-70%
70-60:l
60-55r(
55-50%
50-45 1(
45-407.
Less than 40 %
Nrs. of routes
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6D It should be noted in this context that many fares have djfl'erent
levels according to the season but then again many others are the same f,cr
the whole year. For thjs reason the fare has been
chosen that was avaiLabLe during the high season, this being the fare at
which most traffic tri LL be carried.
63) It appears that on more than half the routes the excursion'l'are is
stiLL more than 70 1( of the normaL economy fare. 0n nearLy 70 Z of the
routes t.lith SpeciaI Excursjon fares these fares are 45 - 50 /" of no:ual
economy and on 55 t of routes with apex fares these fares are even €ts Lot't
as between 30 and 55 7, of rlormaL economy. The spread of the price l.evel for
IT fares is much w'ider I on about 13 "l of the routes they are Louer than
45 % of "uormaL economy" and on 8 it of the routes they are stiLt higher than
80 Z of "normaL economy",
As often with statistics these figures do not reveal the whoLe truth. A
Cifferent picture would emerge if one Lrere to Look at the abso[ute lligures,
as an exampLe the tine from tabte 7'is taken where fares are betweert
55 and 50 t of "hormaL e.conomy". There are :
51 r6utes with Excursion fares at this LeveL
44 routes with SpeciaL trbccursiorr'r faresr only
7 rout es tri th Apex and
81 routes with IT fares at 55 - 50 y. of the normal economy farer.
64) The Latter observations bring us to the consistency of the'l'are
structure. As aLready stated onLy the normaL economy, excursion ancl IT
fares are avai[abLe on a wide scale. This however does not mean thert the
consumer ts necessarily better off on routes with the whole scal-e of fare
types. Two exanples nay illustrate this pointr Exa^nple l:
On narqlr routes with only two tariffs the exoursion fare is as low ar; JUfo of
rhormal economyrr and. the choj"ce of the consumer is to pay the full fer.re with
all its facilities or about half the fare with a linited number of lestrictions,
Exa^rnple 2:
On routee with more fare types the range nay be t
Nornal economy LOO /. )Excursion 8o {" ) of the price of a norma} economy
Special excursion 65 /" ) ticket
apex/rt 50 /" )
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In this case the passenger must accept many more restrictions to use a
fare at half the ttNormal economy'f level.
Needless to say the first example with frfess choj-cerr is a better bargain for the
consumer.
li: l'"3":pgrgngy
65) The obserwati-ons on the structure of fares in this chapter have
so far from the point of view of the airLi.nes not pointed to any illogica1
elements. Also the range of fare levels in the former paragraph LOO'/" 
- 
BO'/" 
-
65'/" 
- 5V/" ft a logioat one, as the fare level recluces when
more limitations are imposed on the passenger.
Yet there are many routes where sorne rnore restrictive fare types are more
expensl-ve than the less restrictive onesi for instance one may sometimes
find that IT basing fares are much higher than excursion fares wi-th fa3
less restrictions on the same route. This is a confusing situation for
passengers who may not be faniliar with aII the fares available on a route.
'Ihls is even more so where attached conditions are extremely complicated.,
unharmonized antl difficult to compare even for professional-s, let alone
the general public.
66) For passengers who make multi sector journeys it may be very
difficult to find out what may be for them the cheapest way to fly even
'i f *ho.' only use one airline and one fare type. Differences in the
total price to be paid for such journeys may arise through a less than
optimal use of the advantages such as commonrating, stop-overs, currency
differences, extra mileages etc. Here again the problem is that passengers
are often obliged to buy a ?rbundled.rr fare where it is d.lfficult to
und.erstand what gervice elements are included. arrd. in what way the
maximum benefit can be achieve.l from those elements. '-lhis makes it difficult
to make the rnost sensible choice in a specific situation.
1i1._Elegents of_yield_dilution
67) {he fare most often quoted"
However, to an airline this fare is
per passenger. Some passengers pay
less (€rgr excorsion, apex etc.)
AEA has illustrated the lifference
revenue in the following graph.
route is the normal economy fare.
synonymous with average revenue
(u.S. first class) others pay
ona
not
more
between economy fare antl average
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Fie, I : Aver.ge revenug per passenger (lq?q)
olo of Eoonomy filre
80
Source: AEA rr4,ir jlares.in Europef' 1977
The difference is however composed of several elements a^nd although airlines
normally defline yield dilution as the difference iLlustrated in fig.1 it
has been formd useful- to use a more limited definition of yield dil-ution
in this examinati.on.
58) The Comnission considers that different fare types should. repres;ent
different prociuct;s a:rd the lower revenue from cheaper products should n,:t
be considered as yield dilution.
The justificatiorr for each fare type should be found in the charact;eris'tics
of the products they represent.
tr'or this exanination,therefore, for each fare type yield tlilution is defined
as the difference between a fare and the actual revenue earned per passenger
traveiling a,t tha.t fare type. The percentage yiell dilution on a rcute
therefore becomes the clifference between the weighted average fare*'per
x weighted average fare is the average of the local fares weigirtecl by the
numbers of passengers using each fare.
liistance txl0O) kms
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passenger and the actual revenue earned per passenger.
69) fn this rlefinition of yield dilutlon only three d.ilutionary elenents
renain; they are prorate dilution, discounts and. d.ilution caused by currenay effect
Of these elements the currency effects are more or less outsid.e the
control of the airlines, while prorate dilution and.discorrnts can be influenced.
directly by the airlines,
a) Proratg {i!u!ign
70) Prorate ti.ilution is a retluction in revenue causecl by a passenger
who travels with a through fare on a multi-sector journeyr e.g. a passenger
who travels from New York to Fra^nkfort vi-a Paris. The through fare is in
most instances lower than the surn of the local fares for each individual
sector, in this case the sectors New York 
- 
Paris an.l Paris 
- 
Frankfort.
'Ihe prorate systern is a system of revenue sliari.ng between the d.ifferent
airlines tluat carry the passenger on one or more sectors of a trip.
The techniques of revenue sharing are explained in appenclix ).
If only one airline carries the passenger on alL sectors of the route the
prorate system 
.can al-so be used as a revenue allocation mehhod.
7f) Table B shows the percentage of prorate yietd diLution for some
fare types on a number of intra-Oommrrnity routes.
For the purpose of this exercise the same classj-fication of five types
has been used as in chapter 3.2.i'rchoicetti i.e. nor![al economy fares,
excui'sion fares, special excursion fares r apex fares an<1 inclusive tour fares.
The fare construction unit (nCU) has been used- in this section as a basis
in ortler to excl-ud,e distortions cause.l by currency effects.
Table 8 does not give any quantification of the total dilution effect but
shows J.ifferences in revenue an airline may receive from a through passenger
on a sector of a multi-*ctor trip in comparison with a local passenger who
travels on a similar fare type.
72-) The first figure in each column is the yielcl clilution in percenrages
on the first sector of the trip and the second figure the diiution on the
second sector. For instance on the first route Lon,lon-Amsterdam-Copenhagen
the airline receives B"fo less revenue on the lonr-lonrArnster,Lam sector from a
normal economy passenger with a ticket Lon.lon-Copenhagen via Amsterdam,
when compared with a point-to-point passenger Sust travelling London-
Ansterdarn.
For the excurslon fare it can be seen that an airline carrying the passeng€r
on the Lon,Lon-Amsterclam sector gets 2'/. less than it I'iould receive from a
Iocal passenger using the excursion fare wr}ile on the Arnsterdam-copenJragen
'sector the airline gets ]O/o less.
TIALD DILL"I,ION PEh F'AIG] TIPE OU
( Fercentage reduction conpared
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SA}IPLE O!' INTiiA-COJd'ruNI1'T ROIITES
to nomal applicable fare type)Table 8
ROUIES
Noroal Econ. Ex.cursion Spec.!xc, Aper IlrE
aector
Second
sec'Eol
Frrst
Sector
b€cotxt
Sector
!'lrBt
aectot
Second
$ector
FiIi€t
aeoto!
5econc
sectot
!':.rst
Secrot
Second
6ecto!
LHR-AIIS-CPH
LHR-3fiU-NCE
ATII-FCGCPX
AIH-FNA-LHR
ATH-FNA-DIIB
LTJX-AMS-CPH
LUX.FCGAIts
!UTLff+ru
DIIB-MAI{-FRA
AMS-BRU-MIL
A}IS-BRU-FCO
CPH-AI{S-LTS
FCO-AIIHPtl
FN,T.BRILLSR
l0
2L
r5
L2
I4
20
23
33
tq
1^
L?
10
25
8
IU
2L
!o
L2
L4
20
23
33
L1
lo
2>
2
27
8
I
31
2'
t-o
a
+I
A
+8
24
lo
7
33
+I0
5)
;
3
+20
32
q
38
25 a4
L4
lo
I
T3) Table g also shows that the percentage of yield. dilution varies
between the different routes. For fare types lower than the normal- economJ'
fare it is also seen that the through passenger in some instances gives tlte
airline a higher yield when compared to a local passenger who travels on eu
sirnilar fare type. ['his is caused by the fact that the revenue from a
througS fare is always shareil on the basis of the normal econolny fares of
the respective sectors and not on the basis of comparable discounted fares.
Iil The major question is whether there is any justification for these:
,Lifferent prices the airlines charge for what is in prinoiple the same pr()duct.
One argument being usetl is that fares per nile over longer distances are l.ower
than over shorter tlistances thus reflecting the lower per mile costs. A fower
per mile cost over longer clistances, however, would follow mainly fron
airlines avoiding a number of costs items which an-incured with each lan"ling
an.1 take-off. A passenger making a multrsector trip should therefore not
necessarily be enti.tled to travel at a price which is in principle baseJ on
a cost level that Joes not inclu.le costs associate.l with intermediate stops.
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15) A counter argument for neverthetess allowi-ng a passenger to use the
l-ower through fare is that the prorate system increases traffic on a number
of routes leatling thus to lower average cosrs per passenger on those routes
to the ad'vantage of both the local passengers and the passengers travelli"ng
on a prorate'l fare. It is further argue.i that in the absence of tire present
prorate system traffic might be concentrateJ on a linite,l nuinber of routes
thus reducing the number of ilirect services.
16) In the Commissionts opinion there is merit in these argumenrs.
There is no doubt that interlining is a necessary el-ernent in a satisfactory
airtrarrsport system. fnterli-ning is faci-litated by a prorate system anci it
seems evident that interlining anil prorating assures a wi.ler availability
of drrect services.
A11 this being true the matter remains a question of proportlon, . O:r sorne
routes yierds are more severely dlruted by prorates than on others.
Prorating to the Commission is an acceptable principl.e.
Eowever, this d.oes not precLude a fair d.istribution of costs.
17 ) In table 9 a similar exercise is reflected
within the EEC but stemming from intercontinental
Tabte 9
for prorated traffic
routeg.
Z YieLd diLution per fare type from inter-continentaI routes
DILUTION ON EEC INTERNATIONAL SECTOR
NY
ATH-BRU-NAS
TYO-AIIS-PAR
MEX-PAR-FCO
J FK-LHR-CPH
J FK-CDG-ATH
FRA-LHR-MEX
BRU-LHR-BGI
LAX-AMS-CPH-AAR
12
7
12
14
18
I
6
13
8
9
20
+28
+4
27
+21
+42
(*)
+8
24
+38
11 (**)
+52
(*) Since "apex" does not exist on CDG-ATH the prorated apex amount has
been compared with LocaI IT.
(**) For the same reason on LHR-BGI the prorated IT amount has been
compared with LocaL superpex.
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From table 9 it may be seen that the yield d.ilution from the lower fare
types is not greater than the dilution from the normal economy fare,. It
appears again that in some instances the airlines are getting a hi6;her
revenue fron the prorateil lower fares when compared with cornparabler loca1
fares.
!),Discounts
78) The second factor causing a reduction in the airlinest yiel'ds
are rLiscounts on the published. fares, such as mentioned in paragraph J2.
On the one hand. there are sometimes comnercia] discounts for customers
who generate a consirierable volume of traffic such as large internartiona,l
firms.
On the other hand rLiscounts are offere.l to certain groups of the g€rneral
public whichrat the nornal fare levels, woul.l probably not use avieution
as a transpc,rt mode to the extent that they use it now.
Examples are spouse fares and special fares for stucients, thirtl age and
children. These fare types could be criticized because they
are not based. on cclst differences nor on conditions to which all nermbers of
the public can comply. Annex B gives an exaraple of a total fare structu:re on
route (i.". Srussels-Athens).
c ) Currency_effects
79) Since the inception of IATA, members have negociated at trerffic
conferences against the background of the faresfrales }evels in locral
currency which they requirerl on their speciflc routes. For the faci.litai.ion
of traffic conference negotiation the fare construction unit* (f'CUlt was
introducel..
* The FCU (Fare Construetion Uni.t ) is a concept establisheil primari,ly trr
assist tariff publishers and is used in all a.spects of ticketing. The
FCU itself equals the IATA basic currency of the US Dollar (pre 7.)'12'ra1ue).
All basic tariffs in UK Pounds are converted to FCUs at the exist;ing
Resolution O21b rate of 2.6057.
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The result is a system of tocaI seLting fares and rates that are
directionaI in nature, and complicated ru[es are needed covering payment
for transportation when a-cumency other than the local curtrency is accepte,l or
payment is made outside of the country where the carriage coumences.
In arriving at seLting fares the procedure is to take the
basic dotLar or sterLing fares (FCUs),
appLy the 021b currency conversion rate as estabLished at the Currency
Conference'in January 1972, and then ad.d. the appropriate "surcharge"
- i.e. positive or negative adjustment factors. The retationship between
the basic US doltars and basic UK pounds sterling was maintained at the
currency conversion rate of US doLLars 216057= 1 pound.
8O) The adjustment factors are appLied either positively or negatively,
pending on the reLative strength of the currencies envotved to achieve
the Local seLIing tariff required. Thus basic fares/rates are cal-
cutated acoording to the following fornula :
Basic Fare (Rate) X Froien Exchange Rate X Surcharge/discount adjustment
factor
81) In simpLe terms therefore the present system of caIcuLating
inter-reLated nationaL currency seLLing fares is based on the process :
a) estabLishment of the fare Leve[, route by route, in terms of FCUs;
b) these FCU units are then converted into nationaL currency equivaLents
by use of fixed IATA exchange rates;
c) the resuLting nationaL currency figure is then subjected to pLus
or minus currency adjustment factors to produce the prices which
the airIine offers to its pubLic after governmentaL approval-
LocaI SeLLing Fare (Rate)
t
(J)
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82). What in fact happens is that states in this u1ay are abLe to {'ix
pr.ices for trips originating in thei r own territory and yet througl'r the
conversion to FCUs it is possibLe to conshwb mutti-sector prices'
The effects on paSsenger and airtines because of currency conversion
and prorating are however obscure.
83) It is not surprising that the present system has proved compl'ex
and difficutt to apply, and that there has been Lack of understanding
of it on the part of air[ine employees, agents and the general pubt'ic'
The system aLso l"e.ads to situations which in the Commission's opinion
are unacceptabLe, whepe services are bought in one state for
use in another stqte and where the price to the consumer because of art'i-
ficiaI exghange rates is different from that charged in the other state,,
The-currency effects uith nespect to airLine revenue wiLl show yieLd
diLutidn for some and yietd increase for others. It is not known what tlre
overaLL ef fect is, i.e. it is di Lutionary or the oppos.ite.
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3.3. The relation of fares to the costs of operation
i . Co3trarison-of fare_types_and_costs_per_route
84) In paragraphs {! - 50 the existence of cross-subj-dization between
routes was demonstrated. l'his observation implies that it is possible to
allocate the airlines I totaf costs to the different
routes which are operated.
'Ihe ECAC report on intra-European ai-r fares focused on the problem of cost
allocation. The report arrived at the conclusion that a reasonably accurate
allocation of costs to routes is possible. It carried out an exercise where
costs were allocated to routes according to alternative atlocation methods
which are actually used by different airlines. The differences in costs
per route were limited. to 10'/o ciepend.ing on the allocation system chosen.
This was, hovrever, only a limited exercise and the difference would probably
have been greater if a common accorrnting system had
been used. 'Ihe ECAC exercise also dj-d not analyse the allocati-on of fixed
costs between areas of operation e.g. Iocal Surope versus the rest of the
world.
85) For an analysis rJ.irectly of the relation between fares ancl costs it
is necessary to carry the aLl-ocation of costs to routes one step further
and to allocate the route costs to the different fare types that are
offered on a route. An analysis of tliis kinJ was canied out in flne L)ll
CAA-E\rropean air fares study. 'Ihe UK analysis showed that on the routes
exami-ned a significant cross-subsidization existed or in other words that
the individual fares were not cost related.
The ECAC task force on intra-European ai.rfares contemplated to carry out
a similar analysis for countries other than the UK but concluCed that the
allocation of costs to different fare types on a route imposes problems
which are very difficult to overcome. First there is the problem of data
availabiLityl many airlines do not collect the necessary data for this
type of analysis. I'here is aLso the more theoretical problem of allocating
the t'jointrr and'rcommontr cost elements to the indivi-dual proilucts represented
by the fare types.
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S6) 'Ihe ECAC task force tried to overcome part of the problem by' loolcing
at -bhre coster rela,tecl to the normal economy fares in isolation cln a seleotion
of 22 intra*Elrropean routes involving ) d.ifferent countries and aillines.
Four of the aj-rli.nes and countries, but only 12 routes, belong tc' the
Cornmunity. Ih" rational behinL thls approach was that one coulcl ar6ge t'nat
otr
regarclles"/ii." al.location methocl one woultl chose;any category of tr:affi']r
r-rhich is being asked to pay more than it would have to for a simileur
service provicieJ separately, is being over-charged'
In order to estinate the costs of senring the normal eoonomy rnarket 1n
isolation EOAC derj.veil for each route the numbers of passengers trelvelling
at the fuIl normal economY fare.
A subjective jurigement was made on the acceptable Ievel of serwice in terms
of frequency and" aircraft type. On the basis of the seat factors iropli-eLl by
the choice of aircraft type and freguency and after allowance for profit t
a'rrequiredn selling fare was derivecl .'Ihis trrequired farett level tuas then
expresseil itr inilex form and the current selling fares at each end r:f the
route were compared to it. 'l'able 10 illustrates the approach an.l talcle i-l
shows the curren-b fares as percentages of the require'l fares on tine 22
routes studied.
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TabLe 11
i noutr ld.ntttt
Source: ECAC 
- 
European air fares study, final report 1!81
8f) The ECAC report rLraws frorn this exercise the following conelusions.
"on short distance routes of up to 600 kms normar economy fares are
generally no higher than the estimateci cost of serving the business
'market in isolation if alLowance is rnaile for d.irectional i-mbalances.
or the longer routes there is a general, but by no means unl-versa1,
tendency for normaL economy fares to exceetl the cost of separate production.
On a number of the routes sturliecl the fare is substa:rtia1ly above this cost,
although there are reasons to believe that the margin would- be much less
for the other airlines on these routes.
Normal econony passengers are obtaining non-prioe benefits from Solnt
production an,i, in particular, a more frequent service than wouiil other-
wise be possi-ble. However, with the exception of some of the shorter routes,
anrl possibry also of the less dense routes on which ihe proportion cf
business traffic is low, they are not obtaining price benefits" 'i.rhus the
price benefits of joint prod.uctlon are falling mainly to non-business
passengers and the service benefits to business passengers. It is generally
the longer routes which hrould be recluced to verlr low frequency if only
business traffic were carried.rt
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b'd) A seconcl, although much more general paper rn thls field was proJuced
by the Unitr:d KingLlom for the Coruncil in the beginnrng of 1980. One of the
charts j-n that pa,per, reproduceil i-n fl-g.l , provitles a comparison between
intra-European normal economy fares arid costs. I'his chart was preparetl as
follows. First 'tlLe UK obtained the local nornal economy selling fare from
each of the severL cities, withi-n the EEC, named in the chart to fourteen
other citi-es in Western E\rrope, ( i ." . AnisterJam, Athensl Bonn, Brussels,
Copenhagen, Dubli.n, Fran.lcfurt, Lon,lon, Luxembourgr l[alri-d, Oslo, Paris, ltomet
Stockholm and Ziir.ich). I'he fares extracted were local selling fares in effect
as on tr'ebruary 1!)BO ancL r.rere obtaine.l from the alrline publlcationtrAi-r'i'ariff'r,
Septeurber IlJp eaition (except tfrat fares from Lontion were obtai-ned from
Bulletin No.2 of the same e"li-ti-on). Local selling fares for citres other than
London were converteil frr:m the relevant national currency into Ster'ling terms
(as a common un:-1; fqr conparison) uslng the bankers rate of exchange in effect
on 11 February 1!)80 as publishe.l in the Financial Times. Direct route
tlistalces for eaolr of the city paj-rs were extracte'l from the IA1'A/1AL
Air ,ii-stances rna.:rual- . !'are levels were then expresseii in unit terms
(pence per kilometre) an.1 plotteJ on a graph. Curves were drawrt to rep'e-
sent the various fares frorn each main city.'Itrese curves were not deriveel
statistically. because of the small number of observatj-ons in each case''
s9) SeconJ, the costs of operating schee|uled serwices over these routes
was estimabe.l . ']]otal operating costs were ca}culated, for a selecti-on of
differentaircrafttypes'overt}rerangeofrr',uteilistancesshownj.nthe
grap}r.Iotalcostslnc]utle,.ltlirectflyirrgcosts,fixe.lcosts,alloverhea.l
costs and capt'l;al charges incluiing Jeprec:-ati-on' Financing charges viere
exclutletl.Ccs.bswereasapp}lcableattheend.of:j-glglevels..l,heestrmation
of the direct operating costs use.l a computer motle} , base.l on the 
ttg36,up of'
6,, cost allocat.'on method-s. Actual cost l-nputs to thi-s model are rler|"ed
from uK civ1l Avj-ation Authority j-nternal sources antl incorporate a wj-de
rangeofer,irlineoperatingcostinfornrati-on.Thisrangewasused'bod<lrlve
estimates r:f lnlirect operating ccst levels. A range of total- costs wl's
thusilerivelr.epreFjentingclifferentaircrafttypes.lhiswasexpressed
ascostspersea-bkj.Iornetreusingtheappropriateseatcr:nfigurationsfor
each aircraft type . '.fhese costs were then converted into passenger corsxs
(pence p"'. ptlkilometre) uslng a passenger loa''t factt'rr of 55i as represen-
tative of sche..luled serwj-ce operations . 'l'he range of costs per passenger
kilonretre clerived in this way was tlien cross-checked agai-nst current costs
calcufatelbyaUKair}ineoperatingintra-Europeansoireduledserwicesand
founcl to be reasonably consistent. .rhis data was plotted as sliown'
* Pal = Passenger
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90 ) It shoulcL be stressed. that this is not a rigorous statistical exer-
cise. The costs of operations expeniences on intra-E\rropean operatibns mh.y
not fal1 entirely within the d"erived rarrge, for exarnple b6cau*e of tLifferent
methods of cost allocation ox because of higher or loi{er co'sts in certain
countri-es. Similarly not all intra-European fares coincicte with the repre-
sentative curves drawn on the graph. Nevertheless this gtaph shows thdt in
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general- normal economy fares in Europe, in early 1pBO, were between J}"f" anl
LOO/, higher than the general level of operati-ng costs. ft is itifficult; to
account for such a large disparity by 'Cifferenoes in the method of cosrt
allocation or ty variation in fares from the general levels shown.
Also the graph shows quite clearly that the percentage of profit of i}le no:rnal
economy fare increases with the increase in distance.
9l-) On the basis of these two studies it seems clear to the Commission
that the economy tariff in particular on point-to-point traffic is yie1ii.in11
high revenues compared to costs, specially on routes irith longer clistances,
ft would have been useful to carry out an analysis of fares in force in
Europe and compare them to the costs of operation on routes. Such inforrnatj.on
does only exist in a few countries ancl the Commission d.oes not feel that orrly
a parti-al presentation would serve a useful purpose. ft is, however, known
to the Commission that a very large variation would. appeax if fares were
compared with costs. ff the break-even seat factor of a fare t;rpe is calculated.
on the basis of costs of operating the route some economy fares would. show
factors below 3aiLwhrle some 1ow fares (".g. Apex) would show more tha:e
LOO'/o. 'Ihe airline would therefore begin to show a profit on that route 1f
it flew with a seat factor of more than 3ort af point-to_point economy
passengers while it woul-d be impossible to fIy at a profit with passen{lers
only at the Apex tarj.ff. fn the Commission's opinion i.t is d.ebatable rhethe:n theee
two sltuations in fact fulfi-l the eriteria of a fare having a roasonabl.e
r"elation to costs and. allowing for a reagonable profit. fhe ]-ow fare m:Lght
even represent a situation where it woultl have to be cleeme,l predatory.
The Commission theref'ore feels that Member States ought to examine these
problems closer. As stated earlier only a very f,ew statbs have been d.oing this.
_39_
ii . !h9 dj.stance_relation of costs a.n.t fares
02) It is believed by many that air fares ought
i.e. the prJ-ce for a longer route should in absolute
the price for a shorter although price per kilometre
the long route. Is this borne out by reality and i.s
supposition?
From the TAr report on the economc cost structure of air-tra'sport
the following graph can be d.erived:
1978 LOCAL EUROFE TING OOST
600 i to9 r.e#i?'",os" iaoS- r,n ! r60c | 2000,l 2200 .
Source: AEA alrllnes daia
and TAI analysls.
however based on average data procrived by A.EA airlines and may
large variations. A more tlirect exarnination of fares and.
therefore been carried. out.
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a) Analysis if the normal economy fare
93) The relationship of fares to distance has been analyse.L by the Commission on J22
non-sto-p routes*within the Commrnlty. ifo cLomestic routes nere include.l
since tre cost stmcture of these routes is li-fferent from that of inter-
national routes.
The first part of lhe analysis consiilered the nor:nal economy fare as thj-s
is the ,lnly fare type guaranteei to be common to all routes. ;Jj-th respect
to the level of fares tire selling fares of 1st July 1980 in tire loceLl
currency at each encL of the route were used, converted in gggtu agarnst the
bark exr:hange rates of 24 June 19J0.
For ri-istances the sector clistances in kilometres r{ere extracteJ frorn the
IATA Dirstance nianual; this implies tirat geographical :listances are use:r
rather tha.n the actual rLj-stances fiown. The latter may be longer due to
d.ivergencies from the most direct route.
e4)
fares
Fis. 4.
f,.f. far.
iB ECU|c
Juc 1980
The following fig. { shows the scattergram of the normal economJ'
by distance.
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Ihe vertical axj-s presents a scale of tariffs expressed in European units
of account and the horizontal atris presents a scale of d.istances expressed
in kilometres. The figure shows clearly that there is an underlylng corre-
lation between fares and .listances.
05) Ihis was confirmed by a statistical analysis which found a very
high comelation coefficient in general. Analysis was carrieJ out for
routes between the 1O EEC countrj.es as a whrll-e and separately for all
the routes originating in each country. These two approaches seemed to
inilicate a significantly stronger correlation between fares and distances
on routes to and from each country separately. This may be explained by
the fact that in the country by country analyses there is no distortion
from arti-ficial IATA exchange rates. From the analyses also the following
information caJl be deriveti:
Irnr 21,4 nf *ho n6qf,gs the actual fares folnd lie within ! zr)riL of t]6eJl" "*level estimateC by the regression 1ine,
43/, of the routes have fare levets 7 5'11" of the estimateri fare }evel,
77/" of the routes have fare fevels + 10y' of the estimates and
96/" of the routes have fare levels + 16'/, (twice the stanrlaril rlevj-ation)
of the fare level as preJ.ictel by the distarice formula,
{:/o of the routes have actual fare fevels that are outsi-de the range
banl of twice the stan.larl deviation.
96) This i-nformatj-on reveals that .listance l.s indeei:L an important
factor anJ the leve] of fares .1oes reflect it, although the scatter
clearly shows that there are other factors also influencing the fare level
on any particular route.
It was conclud,etl i.n earfier stuclies*that the ccrrel-atron'between fares and
Jistances is quite high. Given the fact that fares cn Jifferent routes with
srmilar distances are bound to .riffer due to factors such as differences in
cost levels between airlines, di-fferences in cumencies, traffic volunes on
the route, the traffic mlx etc. The correlation foun.l is probably as high
as could be expected. The correlation is even higher than expected if fares
are really supposed to be cost relate.l anJ it may be said that the hlgh
correlation reflects the efficiency of inter-airline eonsultation. Oae
should realize, however, that a,lifference in fare of 2O/' or more on routes
with equal distances 
- 
as may be the case on 23"h of the routes 
- 
is yet a
consirable Jifference .
* ECAC: European Air fares study.
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97) EVery cost stu.ly which has been un.lertaken iloes iniiicate a basic
unCerlying cost/ai.stance relationship as claime,,i at the begi.nning of this
section. The relationship is afso confirmed" with respect to fares. Local
conJitions anJ fifferences in operation i-ntroduce, however, variables into
the final outcome which means that a Jistance relationship for fares can
at best be only indicative. An interesting feature arises when the cost/
ii.istance relation j-s superimposeJ on tLre fare/.ti-stance relation 
- 
see aLso
fig. 4 - it becomes clear that the shape of the cost curve is not
as steep as the shape of the fares curver confirming the fi-ndings in th,e
former paragraphs 84 
- !1, that the margin between the normal economy fare
an.l the costs i.ncreases by the increase in d.istarrce.
b) Analys_is of the excursrcn fare
98) A sinilar exercise to that for ttrenormal economy fares has been carrieij.
out for the excursion fares. In general the comelation between the ex,:ursi.on
fare 
- 
also expresse,l in local currencies converte.l i.nto ECUts 
- 
and t.he
d.istance is somewhat iower than was the case in the normal economy analysis.
Still the correlation was surprisingly high given the variation in far'e
level as a percentage of the nornal economy fare. Also the correlatj-on
for each c<.:untr,y separately is in general higher than the Community as
a whole, thus s.hov'iing similar results as the normaf economy analyses .
3.4. The level of costs
i. The Cascade stu"ties
ee) 'Ihe preceeding paragraphs were focused in different ways on th,g
question whether an,l to what extent the fares were related to the costs
of operating the air services. The level of costs as such has so far n';t
been iliscussed. There are two reasons to look at the levef itself. First
there is the possibility that the costs of an airline are higher than they
woul-tl be unJer a more cornpetitive regime I such a situation may arise f,rom
the fact tltat the airlines .lo not need to be extremely cost conscious ies
they can set their fares to rnatch their costs wlthout the threat of en'bry
into the market of new, more effj-cient competitors. The second reason is
that the cost levels in Europe may be hrgh, .lue to circumstances outside
the control of the airlines but ilue to the neguLatory regimes jn the fvlember
States and the aviation infrastructune.
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100) With respect to cost efficiency of airlines three relevant stuclies
exist. On the basis of schedule.l airline costs there were two tt0ascaCe studiesir
which exa^riine.l the refative costs of British Airways antl a UK charter aj_r1ine
and the relatj-ve costs of a major Dutch schertuled. carrier anci a maJor Dutch
charter operator only. The third study was a [reverse cascacle[ stu.iy taking the
costs of a charter airline as a basis and. comparing these with the costs that
would incur if the charter airline were to produce a schetluletl service.
The rationale behinrl this type of comparison is that charter airlines in
contrast to scheduled airlines operate in a competitive envirorunent anC that
market pressure necessarily will make them efficient. If the scheduletl airlines
appear to produce at costs whj-ch are higher, the difference may be attri-butable
to the Jifferences in competitive environrnent.
101 ) One of the problems in comparing charter anJ. sche.luleil airlinesf costs
is that one should as much as possible ensure that like is compare.l with like.
The 'rcascaJe method'r eliminates step by step those cost uj.fferences which are
attributable to clifferences in scheiluled and charter operations and not to
differences in efficiency. As a result a figure is.leriveJ., i.e. the so-ca1 le;L
trderi.ved charter costs[. These are the costs of a simulated charter operation
based on the schetluled. airLinets level- of cost efficiency*. A comparison between
the trderived charter costs[ anJ the actua] costs of a charter airline shows the
costs d.ifference that remains i.f both ai-rlines were to offer a simil-ar pro,luct.
fO2) The steps inclu,leil in the analyses to arrive at comparable figures
between schetlufed and charter efficiency were the following:
1 ) Sates Commission - t'hese costs are not relevant to the charter servlce
a.nt1 are thus .leducted.
- 
Eliminates the effects of first class services which
cloes not exist for non-scheduled.
3) Seating density 
- 
Makes allowance for the ci.ifferent seating pitch in
scheduled and non-scheduled operations.
^\ -2,, 'I'ourr.st ctass
4) Load factor
5) neaX/trough ratj.o
* Takes into account the effect of increasing the passenger
loa.lfactor from JJ/" for scheduled. services to B5trt whichis typical for charter operations.
- 
Charter airlines have a larger seasonal variation and
thus higher oosts.
* Cost efficiency expresses the anount of money the airline has to pay for a
certain production unit; this in contrast to e.g. labour efficiency which
expresses the amount of labour that is needed. for a certain output. An
airlj-ne with more employees per ton/kil-ometre production but l-ower salaries
may be more cost efficient than an airllne with less employees but higher
salaries.
b J Ut]-rlsatl-on
7 ) Stan,faras
B) tlot applicable
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Charter services are assuned to be able to achieve
Z5f, ni*ner utilisation of both crew and aircraf't thran
scheduleC.
Takes account of the costs attributable to the highr:r
stanilarrl- of service of the scheduleJ" mod-e.
In this step those costs and revenues were adjtrsted
that occur for sche'Juleel services but not for ohartr:r
services . This a.l justment relates to two main elreas:
sal-es, resernrations antl advertising costsi car€lo
revenue and bar Profit
ro3 )
I. Total scheduled cost Per Pax
2. Deduct commission
3. Tourist class
4. Seating density
). LoaC factor
6, Peak/trough ratio
r TT+l'l ..i ^^+i ^-l. UUIIlD4Ururr
B. Stanilards
!, Not applicable
IO. Derived charter
11. Charter actual
Route A
100
B6
II
56
OU
tr7
-,t I
1/t 
- 
?,-/
JA JI
fne 1975fi6 figures for the British Ai.rways/JK charter airl1ne
comparison are reprod.uced. in table 12. A11 figures are in index form,, taking
the sched.ulecl costs per passenger as a basis (fOO). The tenth tine oll the
table represents the costs that would occur if British Airways 
"s3s 1;o
produce a si-milar protluct as the charter airline vrhose costs are refl.ecteil
in the eleventh li-ne.
Table 12: British Airwavs cascade analvsis
Route B Route C
100 100
o) q'l/-
84 87
Qn R]vv vJ
5g 6c
/^ a1oz oJ
60 6r
qt 5?
/J
< I 1\'
J I J/
J I J/
7) 1qJA JJ
Lo4) ,.lhe costs that have been used for the Dutch cascatle arralysirs Jid
not incluile commission nor rloes the Dutch ai.rline operate with a fir;st
class service in Furope. For this reason the first two steps includeJ' 1n
the UK exercise could be eliminateC from the Dutch analysis. The Dut,:h
analysis also was only camieri out for one route which is comparable
mostly with the UK route trC".
'.+)-
The results r.rf the Dutch a:ralysis are repro"luced in the following tabte 13,
where al-so a conipari-son is made with the results of the UK exercise. For
the purpose of comparison the UK figures were recalculated to take account
of the two cascatle steps that were not inclurleJ in the Dutch analysis.
Table 
_13: Comparison of UK_and Du'bch cascade anal-.yses
,rcasca,Le,' Dutch UK ( route c )
analysi-s a,nalysi-s
1. ScheLlulei cost per passenger 100 IOO
2. Seating density 92 95
3. Load fac'Lor 68 69
1. Peak/trcugh ratio 69 72
). Utrlisa,tion 6d 7O
6. StanCar"ds 68 6L
| . r{v u o;ryrrvaur€ 54 45
8. Derive'l charter ,4 45
p. Actua} charter 5I 4A
105) ft would appear that only a relatively srna,Il proportion of the
difference between scheduled and charter costs cannot be attributed. to
inherent Jifferences between the two moCes of operation. The Dutch'rcascaderr
reveals an estimated ! - 6'/" aifference between itderivecl chartertt anl 'ractual
charterrr costs; the UK trcasca.Le" ari estimate"l l2El6 difference. Botlr'icascad-estl
attach par:ticular significance to the t'loal factor'r ancl 'rnot applicablett
ad justnents. Witir respect to tlie 'tno't appl j-cable'r ail justement it should be
noteil that the costs that fall und.er this heaoling represent more than ZOia
of the total scheduled airlines I costs and tlte exclusion of these costs from
the analJ'ses consequently neans that no conclusion can be drar^rn on the
efficrency of specific scheduled activities sucir as sales and reservations.
106 ) The clifference between the Dutch trschecLulect cost'r per passenger
anil 'ractual chartertr cost per passenger does appear to be somewhat less
marked than that implietl by the UK data. This nay be indicative of diffe-
rences in the relative effi.ciencies of the tvro schedulect operators.
Alternatively, 1t may reflect a more competitive UK charter market.
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Part of this variation in relative costs may also be attributable to the
trvo sets of data not being entirely consistent.
ItReverse Cascadeft
107) A third cascade analysis was recently carrie,l out in the Uni'bed
King"dom; the methodolory used was basically the same as the one used .for
the previous two exercises be it that this time the costs of the charber
airline were taken as a basis and those costs were ttcascadetl uprt to the
level at which the charter airline could operate a scheduled service
comparable with the type of service offered by a scheduled airline '
The'tReverse Cascaden indices are shown in Tabfe I{ below. Those in c,th:mr:
I relate to the 2) percent utillsation ailjustment ancl the notional pe,ek/trough*
allowance, Those in column ff show the effect of omitting both the utilisa,tion
and the peak/trough ratio adjustnents altogether.
@4,: ttReverse Cascadett
Column I Column II
Charter cost per pax 100 100
1. Not applicable 1I8 11B
2. Standards r33 133
3, Utilisatir:n L4L 133
4. Seat Factor 191 f78
l. Seating Density 211 L97
6. Peak/rrough ratio 203 L97
7. Commission 2L9 214
Derived scheduled. cost per pax 2L9 2L4
108) The difference between the charter and derived scheduled cost
indices implies that, even assuning no efficiency d-ifferences between the
two mocles, one might expect to fincl sche.luled costs (ancl therefore fares)
some 1IO to 120 percent higher than charter costs even on the sarne roate.
rrReverse Cascadetr also demonstrates that by far the rnost important si.ngle
adjustment is that relating to nodal ciifferences in seat factor, This
ad.justment alone probably accounts for some {0 percent of the total
sched.uled /cbarter cost clifference .
x See for further details annex 6 rfReverse Cascade'r arui annex 7 trGlossary of
temstr.
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As the ,Reverse cascade't study had not been published at any earl-ier
occasion the full detalls on that study are add.ed to this report as
Appendix 6.
I09) The stud.ies refemed to above seem to indicate that for the
airlines investigated the clifferences in cost levels between the charter
and scheduled mode are much smaller than one is inclined to assume at first
sight when l-ooking at the differences in fares. In spite of the thoroughness
of the analysis it is inevitable that there are still some inaccuracies in
the calculations and the results are heavily dependant on assumptions with
respect to load factor differences, seating density and sales costs. For
these reasons one shoultL not attach a LOO/" accuracy to the absol-ute size
of the cost d.ifferentials found between the scheduled- anrl the charter
airl-ines.
110) One shoulil note that the rrCasoade'r method. cloes not al-low conclu-
sions on the effici-ency of the rrsales functionr! of the scheduled airlines
as the commercial- costs and commissions were excluded in one of the Cascade
steps. Sa1es costs in Europe Co account for more than 2Of" of the total
scheduled airlines I costs anil are as was described i-n the AEA [sales costrl
stuclyx, noted aS' being very high for most European sched.uled operators.
It shoul.J be noteC, however, that the stutlies do seem to provide good
evidence that a norrnaL economy tariff should be more than cioubl-e a nonnal
charter tariff.
i-i " Breakdown and evolution of costs oer eost calegory
ltl) In order to illustrate the importance of the major cost categories
the following table l) represents the breakdov'rn of the AEA carrier group
costs.
x AEA: 1!l! 'tSales Costsr'. A comparative trbra.mination Between AnA and USAirIines.
(4)
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!3!]g.!!,: Breakdown of cost categories
't o70
General- & Adninietrative and Other ticket/Sales/promo-
/o of Local
operatine costs
to r ,lLl.O io
tr\rel + 0i1
Station and Grouni
Lanling anl Route charges
Cabin Attendants & Passenger serwices
l,Iaintenance & 0verhaul
Flight Deck Crew
Conrncissions
Depreciation, Rental, Amc.rrtisation
Flight, Equipment fnsurance
tions
1r / |r) .O '/o
r4.7 
')i"
Lr.2 'l;
LO.z 'h
9.8 rt
-..nI.J P
/ n ,'/o.l io
/.,'lo.) 70
o.4 ,i"
f12) l'he average operating costs per avai-lable seat kilometre expresseJ
in US ig have inoreased frorn 19?3 to L979 by 131+.5 7,1. tliis flgure is hor'tever
j_nfluencecl by the change in parlty between the uS $ an,l the Lbropean
currencies.
A correction for these changes would bri-ng the cost increase dor^m to
1ZO.5 7./u whi-ch coul,i be compared rvith an increase of the OE6D consumers
prLe inilex for Europe of )L'/o over the sanne period.. l'{hereas ai.r transport
useJ to beoome relatively cheaper over the years by means of a lower tharL
average cost infl-ation, this sltuation came to a].I en.I after L973.
lI3) 'Iable 15 gives the break clown of the total costsxin ten cost-
headings.
!3!}a!!.: ituolution of cgsts Io73 - 1q7o
G.& A, other tlcket/Sales/Promotion
F\rel & Oil
Station & Grounl
Lancling & Route charges
Cabin Attendants & Passenger service
Ivlaintenance & Overhaul
Flight Deck Crew
Corunisslons
Depreciation, Rental, Arnortisation
Flight Equipment fnsurance
r919
us//asu Rank
107?t/ | J
#/asu
Grorrrtlt
73-Lgi',9
'r rP.2
L.235
o.945
o.824
U.OI.L
o.5r9
o.543
o.o29
I
z
L
4
)
7I
8
t0
o.7 39
0.332
^ 
1?.o
0.301
o.353
o.394
0.3o9
o.221
0.35r
0.043
I
2
B
A
J
7
5
10
roo.7 /"
296.L /"
Izg.L "io
2L4.O'h
142.2 
'/"IO9.I "/"
97 .7 ',h
L52.9 /"
)4. I /o
1^ / .!
- 
Jz.o lo
TOTAL B.z{0o J.)o1 134.5 ',i
x exclud.i'ng financlal charges
Ir4 )
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Without the soaring i.ncrease of the costs for fuel & o11 and the
land.ing & route oharges the total cost increase night have been the eane
level as the general inflation, These latter two elements only ranked. 5th
ana Stfr in importance in 1973 but they are now the second arrd fourth largest
single cost item. tr{ith the percentage cost increasesas they are at
preeent they coull becone soon the two largest cost items. Specially
with respect to the land.ing & route charges governments should realize that
these costs are no longer a minor item in the total operating costs and
further increases are bound to influence the level of fares.
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4. CONCLUSIONI]
1 15) This report is mainLy based on existing information which in some
cases may not be ful-Ly up-to-date but which nevertl^eIess permits the Commission
to draw meaningfuL concLusions on scheduled passenger air fares in the Community.
The characten of the foLlowing concLusjons of which the major ones arre indicated
and nurbered .i n the margin is such that more up to date information wouLd not
change nost of them. The report shouLd therefore, together t,iith the forthcoming
consideratjon:; on the go,mp31 ibiLityof the pnesent methods of fixing air fares
with the EEC Treaty, constitute an adequate basis for pot'icy formuLation in
th'i s area.
4.1. The process of tariff settjng
116) tJith respect to the process of fix'ing scheduLed passenger air fares
! the Commission notes that the procedures are lqther time consumi and tfEtl-
I airtines are seLdom in a position to quickly implement their own commerciaL
judgement. Some ECAC Member States have aLready reaLized that the present
system needs to be reviewed and ECAC made an attempt, so far without success,
to modify the 1967 nultiLateraL agneement so that it wouLd become Less cumber-
some to estabLish air fares. The mod'ifjcations wouLd have given more direct
possibiLities to thjrd and fourth freedom carriers to decide on new fares on
the routes concerned, whereas now in principLe the'interest of aLL other
carriers - aLso fifth and sixth freedom carriers and carriers on adjacent
routes - must be fuLLy taken into account. Such modifications wouLd bring the
1967 nultiLateraL agreement more in Line with the present IATA practice.
It u;ouLd aLso have become easier to introduce tariffs on which airLines had
not reached an agreement.
In generaL the Commission thinks that many ideas put forward during
the ECAC effort nerit credit and one of the fieLds for future action for the
I Er.opu"n Community shouLd be to achieve a Less rigid tar^iff setting procedureI for intra-Community ain traveL. The Commission wiLL pursue its refLections on
the question, particuLarty in reLation to the compatibiLity of the present
system with the competition ruLes and wiLL nrake a further communication on
the subject.
/*.2. Aspects of air fares
117) Ai r fares, as they result
have been evaLuated in this report
These criteria foLLow from aviation
which the Commission undertook with
from the present reguLatory system,
to i LLustrate a number of criteria.
Law and ruLes and from the hearings
interested parties.
ii. Reasonable profi-ts
rra\LLI ) c;rr-trelsm rs often expressed on the level of aj_r fares in tlie
Comnunity. Inforsration from scheduled airli.nes tleuronstrate that the overa]L
t of t rat ions a] Euro ves rnuch to be desi_red.. 'I'he
allocation of fixed costs between ,lifferent geographical areas of operation
nay however influence the profitability of the operations in Europe. The
Commission can not say whether the unsatisfactory operatrng rati,o in Europe
is explalned in this way.
The dj.fference between the rcAo published operati_ng ratj-os anJ the AEA
published operating ratios have indicateJ at least that the profrtabi-lrty
r worLJ resion is er sensitive to the costs are al-IocateJ tc; trre
regiqnsn but-neilhgr the AEA n9r the ICAO ratios give evidence of excessrvgearnlngs ].n ]ocal l$rope overall_.:uhapter J also showed a wide variation of profitabilrty between routes
inplying that sone routes are cross-subsid.ized. by others. In the Conmissionrs
oplnion this is generally acceptable but only to the extent that
each route should at least cover the incremental costs of operati-ng tnat
route and the number of routes that do not fu1ly cover tire total costs of
operation should be strictly lirnited.
However, on some routes the level of profi-ts may be so hr.gn that the cuestion
of their conpatibility with articLe 86 arises.
_il ._The_19v91_o! go:t!
il8) Having observed that profitabllity is not excessive one mrght
ask whether the effici.ency is too low or j.n other worls i.f the costs are
too high.
The rrcascaderf stutiies show first of all that the d.ifference in efficiency
between scheduled prrd non-seheduled airlines is not enc,rrnrius. Seconrlly,
however, the studies J-o show that a cii-fference exists. Thls utifference
may be esti-mated differently accorJing to the assurnptions un.Lerlying the
comparj-son. rt has been estj-mated as low as about 5'i" ntri as hr1;h as zJ'1".
Thj.s d.ifference is very much dependant on the proJuct which air airiine
offers. If costs are represented per passenger carried it seems reilsr,,nabl-e
thrt
cost }evel- for a nonnal economv fareJassenqerr .bhe latier denandlng
considerably rnore flexibllity an.t access possibrlrties than the charter
passenger.
4.
q
7,
t perc s well above
of new cost efenents such
charges and probablY also
leading to the situatlon
l-ess traffic .
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neral inf] rate tlue to the inc.Lusion
as environmentaf charges and airport safe'by
ilue to the demi-nishlng growth of air traf:fic
where governrnents I costs raust be covered- \y
r r o\ In
recluctions
First there
which have
for fuel. U
122 \
shows
the Cornmissionrs opinion there are a few areas where cost
or at least cost control seems possible '
are the government charges for the use of infrastmcturt;
increased over the last six years nearly as fast as the price
9n
J.U.
11.
L1 .
13.
14.
Llv ) A second area is an area where airlines have the most discretlon
themselves, namely their sales activlties'
sales costs in Europe seem. to be extrernely high. AEA proveii this themsefves
i.n their sturiy on the comparison of corornerciaL costs in Europe versus the usA'
One can put the question whether:
a) all the sales activities are really necessary, and
n) to the extent that they are neeiledl are they in'leed need'ed' for local
European traffic?
t2r ) Although cost control maY lead to lower prices in relatj.ve terus a
La r effect to the be ed. throush cha^nges in lhe proi[ucts
whieh airlines are offering, roaybe in fact by elininating some of the sen/l-ces
which are includ.ed. in many of the present fares but which the passe'ngers do
not need under al-f circumstances.
ii-i. Reasonable re.lationship to-costs
l)re evi,tlence produced with respect to the normal economy fare
that the relation between thls fare ancl the costs--gL&Jg
but t marEin of Profit 149-r9-eE-9E
considerablv on farEer distances. To what extent cross-subsidization be1;ween
the dlfferent fare types takes place and if an unaooeptable sltuat:Lon exists
reguires a d.etailed" analysis of the relation of all fares and costf; on rndivi-
dual routes.
It seems evident to the Conmission tbat few governnents d.ispose of the
necessary infornation to eontrol whether individual air fares are :reasonably
related to costs.
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123) The Cifference in profitability between short and long haul routes &ay
also be the result of trunk carriers being 
"obliged.n to operate sone
short routes although they are in fact not profitable because of compe-
tition fron other rnotles of transport or because the airlines in question
have not suitable equiprnent. It seems indicated to the Cornmission that there is
risk that a very conpLicatecl and inefficient fleet structure would reEu1t if an
ai-rline tries to keep a range of different aircraft types suited for all
sorts of routes from short haul thi-n routes and short haul high density
routes to long haul thin routes and long haul hj_gh density routes.
124) In general it also seems unreasonable to the 0ommission that the
economy fare type in some i-nstances is profitabre at a breakeven load
factor of onlv lO',{ or less. A break-evep loacl factor of a.bout EO 
- 
6O lj
seems more reasonabl-e. Such a fact may be an indication of a situation
where an airline does not have an aircraft we}l suited to the route" or an
inCicatlon'that far:es have been set at an unceEsonabte levet which shou[d be
examined in the Light of art.86 of the Rome Treaty.
j-v. The 'bariff's of other airlines anui the pre.latory effects
'I 25) The irnportairce tha'b the tariffs of other airlines bear on the
approval of new tarj.ffs shoull in the Conmissionrs opinion be limiteJ to
the tariffs of thi-rd and fourth freeJorn caruiers on each route and in particular
that such proposals shou-ld not have a character of dunpin,rr. this is i-n
the Comrnissionrs rniru{ at any rate not the case when the proposed tarj-ffs
have a reasonabfe relation to their costs.
y._ logngryble_fares_over the same_distance
Lzo ) ft has been demonstrated that there i-s indeed a fair reLationship
between the normal economy fare and the dista^nce- fl"own antl a sornewhat less
narked but nevertheless statistically inportal.t, relation between the excursion
aral distance.fare/ This criterion is in conflict with other cri.teria such as reasonable
profits on a route and a reasonable reLation of fares to the costs of
operation. fn the Commissj-onrs opinion the latter two criteria are more
important. 'Irhe Commission finds similar fares over sinilar di-stances tcr
sorue extent J.esirable but it fincls that important differences in the costs
;of operation between airLines anJfor routes shouLci be reflecteC in the
respective tariffs.
t7.
r8.
yi: th9 interest_of the users
L2I) Apart from the interest which the users have in the earlier
nentioneti criteriarsuch as the fares relation to costs and comparable
fares over comparable clistancesr the users take a rnore specific interest
in the choice of tarlffs that are available an.l in the transparency of
the existing fare strrrcture and in the conditions refated to the fa,res.
a) Ctroice of tariffs.
fZB) ffre Conmi.ssion consid.ers that the present fare structure is too much
a result of the interest of the ai.rlines where the airlines can mak.e raaximum
use of riiffe::ences in price elasticity between passenger categories.
The Comrnission fin.lsras this is reflected in chapter 3lthat there a're nany
routes where the consumerlchoice is too ]imited art.l where no low tariff's
types (".S. based on a break-even seat factor of B5/r) are available.
fzg) When the nosnal economy fares are cost based they are often based
on an assune.l seat f'actor of arounrl 5O'h. this is undoubte.lly correct for'
this type of product aml it reflects many gualities an.1 1n particular th.e
full flexlbility whj.ch is required by a lar6;e number of passeng;ers.
130) However, the Commission thinks that also on routes to regions
where there is no charter competition or where tkrere is no strong n.arket
for leisure traffic the passenger should be given the opportulity to travel
at a fare level which is basecl on a much higher seat factor than th.e economy
tariff. This is not generally the case at present and the Commissicn thinks
that, as long as the airlines are protected both with respect to narket
access and pricesrairli-nes shoukl afso offer at least one rrnbundled. low fare on
route they operate, in aCCition to an economy type farerwhich is ba.sej cn eacn
point-to-point transpr:rtation costs with an option of buying a reservation.
b) Transparency.
13]) With respect to the limitations and conditions quoteclr specially
to the 1ower than normal economy fares, the Comrnission thinlcs that tltis
situati.on ls untolerablv complicated. It shoul,.l be possible to introduce
more simplj-fication. This would improve the understanding of tkre travelling
^rrhl 
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1l,2) To thls und,erstanrling would aLso contribute the above mentloner-i.
mininum fare strrrcture as the passenger could actually see by compari-son
the price he needs to pay for a certain anount of flexibility he may want
to naintain while he is travelling by air. It is only fair to say that on
some routes there is indeecl a development in this direction.
vii. Access to_the_mark"! 3"9 corapetition
The present report does not deal with the question of market
access and cornpetition.
The situation which the Cornmission found with respect to tariff setting,
fare structure and cross-subsidization between routes and nost probably
also between fare types (although this latter point renains to be explored),
strengthens however the Cornmissionts opinion as expressed in its memorand.uro
of l)l) on rrcontributions of the European Connunities to the developnent
of Air Transport Se:rrices" that nore opportrrnities shouLd be given to airline
initiatives in intra-Connunj-t.y traffic, both with respect to products
offered on a route and narket entry.
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PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA USED BY GOVERNMENTS FOR EVALUATING AIR FARES
BE LG I OUE
Les proc€dures d'approbation des tarifs des services a6rlens
r6gullers sont d6flnles par les clauses qul les concernenrt
dans les accords a6rlens bilat6raux sign€s par 1a Belgiqure,
ainsl que par I'Accord lnternational de L967 sur la pro-
c6dure applicable a 1 ' €tablissement des tarifs des servicres
aEriens r6guliers, ratifi6 par 1a Belgique. Ces dispositions
pr6voient g6n6ralement que les tarifs sont d'abord coDV€nius
solt conform6ment aux rEsolutions 169issant les tarifs qu'i
auraient pu 
€tre adoptEes par I ' IATA, soit par entente directe
entre compagnies a6riennes d6sign6es. Ils doivent ensuiter
€tre soumis a I'approbation des autorit€s aEronautiques.
L'Adminlstratlon de 1'A6ronautique belge estime que les
entreprises de transport a6rien doivent, autant que possible
recourir a la procEdure de ITTATA pour l'Elaboration des
tarlfs.
Pour la procEdure d'approbation, lrAdministration de
I'A6ronautigue appligue le princlpe gue les tarifs doivent
€tre Etablis i des taux ralsonnables, compte d0ment tenu de
tous les 6l6ments d'appr6ciation, notarrunent du co0t d'exploi-
tatlon, d'un b6n6flce raisonnable, ainsi que des tarifs
appllquEs par les autres entreprlses de transport a6rien.
. ANNEX 1 .2.
--
EUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSg{LAND
Alle Fluglinientarife, die lm Verkehr mlt den Bundt'si'epub)lk Deutschland
oder lnnerhalb des Bundesgebietes zur Anwendung kcrnmen sollen, badtirfen
den vorherigerr Genehmlgung durch den Bundesminlster fUr Verkehr.
Fechtsgrundlage fi.tr die Genehmigung ist $ 2l Luftverkehrsgesetz ([rrftVG)
l.V.m. den Vorschrlften der jeweils anlscr*bn der Bundesrepublik Deutsctt-
Iand rurd ausliindischen Partnerstaaten abgeschlossenen bi.Iateralen Luft-
verkelrrsabkonunen
Die Tarife, die auf derr vereinbarten Lirriur ftlr FIuF€5ste und Fracht
arrzrrwenderr sind, werclen urrLer BerUcl<sichtigrnpl aller Faktoren, wie cler
Kostep des Bet.riebes, ejnes angemessenen Cewintts, der besortdererL GellcLrt"n-
heiten der verschiedenen Lirrien und der von anderen Ulltenrehmett, wr-'Ictte die
gleiche Linie ganz oder teilweise bet.reiben, verarendetrrn Tarife fs-stt$setr.t,
Die Tarife wcrde.tr, r.rcnn nrogliclr, fUr Jede L,inle durch Vet'einbat'ttrtg der
betelligten berrannten Unternetunerr festges€tzt, Hierbei sollett sich die
berrarurten U0tenref[nen nach derr Beschltissert richten, dir: aufl'ruttd dt's
Tari ffesLsetzrlrrgsverfahrerrs des Intenrationalett Luftvet'keltrsverbr:tdt-'s
(IATA) arrgcwerrdeL werden kiinrrerr oder die benannten Utrfernelrmen sollen
sich rrach einer. Bcraiung mit dem Luftverkehrsuntentehmen dribter Staatent
welche die gleiche Linie ganz oder tei.lwelse betreibenr wenn mogtich
unrnittelbar unterejnattder verstiindigett. l
Dje auf diese Weise festgesetzten Tarife sollen den Luftfahrtbehiir$en
eines Jeden Vertragsstaates werrigstens 3O Tage vor dem llt Au-sslcht tle-
norlzner)en Inkrafttreien zun GepehrnlgUng vorgelegt brerden. ,
Das auf deuLscher SeiLe fflr die Cenehmlgung der Tarlfe zust5ndil;e Buntles-
verkehrsminlsteriurn prflft vor einer Entscheldung, lnwleweit die beantraSten
Tarife hinsichttich threr ttdhe und Struktur marktgerecht und wtter Ber0ck-
slch0i6.rng der tatslchllchen Kosten des Flugbetrlebs der einzelnc'n Llnien
angem,-.ssen kalkullert sind.
In derr FAIlen, in denen vorgenannte Wirtschaftllchkeitskriterien nicht
erfiJllt sind und insoureit befl.lrchtet werdett muB, daB di.e Dunchfi,lhrurtil eines
slcheren und lelstungSfdhtgen Flugbet.rit:bs gefShrde! sqitt kann' lst dle
6enehmigurrg zu? Anwendwrg der beantnagtert Tarlfe zu versagen. Versa63:rrgs-
nr6gltchkeiten bestehen fenier aus folgenden Gestchtspurrkten:
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1, Schut.z des Verbrauchers vor Uberhtihten Flugprelsene
2. Schutz des deulschen Flugllntenunternehmens vor
ruinOsem Wet,tbewerb,
3. Beni.lcksichtigung sonstlger dffentlicher Interessen.
Fijlrrt ein Unternehmen oture die nach $ 21 erfonderliche Gertrltunl-,
gung Fluglinienverkehr durclr oder wendeL es nicht gcttehmig'Ee
Tarife an' so harrdelt es 8em. $ 58 LuftVG ordnungswidrig. Ordnungs-
widnigkeiten kdnnen nach $ 58 LuftVG mib einer CeldbuBe bili zu .
20.0OOr-- DM (Zr+anzigtausend Deutsche I'4ark) geahndet. werden.
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DENMARK
r. tsottr domestlc and lnternatlonal avlatlc.rn ls regulated
by the clvlr Avlatlon Act, the authorlsed reguratory body
belng the Minlstry of Publi.c works. 'scheduled fares and
rates have to be submltted for approval- to the Mlnistry,
whlch can approve or dlsapprove totally, or approve ln part
or wlth certaln .onittlons.
2. Denmark ls a signatory to the L967 lntbrnatlonar Agree-
ment on.the procedure for the establlshment of tarlffs for
scheduled alr servlces, which replaces tartff clauses lrr bi-
lateral agreements among signatories of the Agreement or
supprements agreements whlch have no tariff clause.
3. Denmark supports in principre rATArs fare and rates
settlng maclrinery. 'when thls Minlstry rect-,ives a rATA-pacL xlt
for approval, the Mlnistry examines the proposed fare/ ri:Lc*
level and structure as compared wlth the already exlsting.
Tlte MirrisLry may then seek supplementary informatlon on certcrin
polnts at tlre flling. rt happens especiarly as regards the
socalled Fuel-increases that the Minlstry has not found
sufficlent'justtflcaLion for some of the faresr cortained ln
a rATA-package. consequently those fares have not been
approved. So far the reactlon has not been a formal rejectlon
of the lATA-package as suchr but adJustments of the currency
factors.
4. In case of an open-rate situatlon wlthln IATAr the Mlnistr::.
ls responslble for assesslng fares. rn the first prace, the
Mlnletry endeavoure to persuade the alrltnes to come tog€thr'r
. 
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and try to reach an agreement on fares. Any such agreement
ls subject to government approvel. Failing agreemcnt bcttwccn
carrlers, consultatlons hrlth the comPetent authoritles of tlre
other party are lnltlated ln accordance wlth the provlsl'ons
of'the bllateraI agreement' 1f any'
5. A slmllar procedure ls followed when atrllnes which dEe
not members of IATA apPly to the Ministry for fares approval'
6. No wrttten dlrectlves exlst concerning criterla to be
used for evaluatlng alr fares. In assesslng whether fares
are reasonable, the mlnlstry seeks to strlke a balance between
the lnterests of consuners and the need for alrllnes to
cover thelr reasonable costg.
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PNOCEruRES IIT CRITERES I,NILISES POUR L'SVALUATION DES TARIFS AERIENS
E{ FRA}ICE
Dr Francer le Cod.e de Iraviation civile exige que les propositione de
tarifs soient d6pos6es pour approbation auprbe d.e lrautorit6 appropride. Tous
Ies transporteurs exploitant des eervices de pagsagerg sur le tenitoire national ou
en provenance ou i destination du temitoire national sont tenus d.e sounettre leurs
propositions tarifaires au Ministlre deo Transports. Seu1s les transporteurs
erploitant dee aironefs ilrun poicls naxinun au cldcoll.age inf6rieur i 5rT tonnes
et transportant noine tle eir paasagers sont er'enptds de cette exigence. Er ce gui 1
dor':err.e 1ee vols ri;:l.iers, les propositio:re de tarif Coiverit sprlcifre: La ro:te
et la catdgorie tarifaire. Les propositions de tarif doivent 6galenent incliquer
Iee cond.itions g6n6rales d.u traneport 
"t 1"" rid.uctions que lee transporteurs
ont lrintention d'appliquer pendant des p6riodes d6terx0in6es ou droffrir i des
cat6gories de trafic d6ternin6es. Lee conditions g6n6rales cle transport comprennent,
notarnment lee conditions de sefvice et Itam5nagement de la cabine, lee conditione
draccba, le cae dch5ant, b ce type de tarifr tlur6es de e6jour, d6lai d'achat i
lravance, facilitds de tranefert et dfarr€ts volontaires en cours de route, cor:di.-
tlons de paiement et de renboureeroent etc...ainei qJue Ia eaieonnalitd, la capauitir
dlsponible pour le t;rpe de tarif, conelddr6, Ia franchise dee ba6ages, les corn-
nisElong vers6es au:' agenceE. Si le l,tinistire ne rdpond pas dans un ddlai dturr
nois b partir de la date du dip8t, lee tarifg eont censds Btre applicables.
2. Lee tarifs rtdpos6s auront nornalernent d6jb 5t5 acceptds dans le cadre
drun organigrne reconnu par le Ministbre, tel qJue lIIATA. Er Errope, lradninistratrt
frangaise srappuie aur ltAccord a6rien de L967. Elle approuve g6n6ralement Les
structuree tarifaires gui ont rainsln, fait lrobjet drun accortt uultilat6ral inter-
conpagnies et qui sont conpatibles aveo les tarifs des servicee exploit6s dans des
contlitions anologues nais Eur des dietancee tliff6rent es.
3. Les nodifications de la structure ou des niveaux dee tarifs sont examin6c's
dans leur conterte propre plut0t quren fonction drune norne univereelle. La
recette pr6nre par paasa€erlcilonbtre est conparie i celle de tarifs exietants
darre la nOne rdgion et sur dee dietancea a.naloguee. Dans le cas de tarifs rddui.tt"
nouveaur, iI eet inportant qurils nraient pas clreffet nuisible sut le trafic
transport6 aux tarifs erieta"nts, ce gui nenacerait la stmcture en vigueur.
Cepenclant, crest sur leg'routes b pr6doninance touristique que lrintroduction de
tarifs rdduits fait lrobjet drune coneid6ratlon favorable.
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4. Conne tout changement de la etrlcture ou des nlveaux dee tarifc a6it
aur les recetteg totales ds Ia conpagnie a6rienne, le Ministbre clemarrde des ren-
seigneurentg qui lui pernettent dreetiner ees avantages pour le public et ees effete
sur la situation 6conorniqqe du transporteur, principaleroent en ternes de recettes, cle
d6veloppenent du trafic, de coefficient de renplissage et de recette unitaire
noyenne. Si lraction gouvernenentale vise b aesurer Ia sant6 riconor"i.que du trarsport
aerien elle tend augsi b assurer la protection du public. Crest alnsi que des
nesures gouvenrenentaleg interdisent ou limitent la repercussion dans les produits
touristiquee (eaeentiellenent populaires par nature) aes hausgeg des tarif'e a6r'iens
entranrt dans Ia conposition de c€B produits.
5, Lfadninistration frangaise tient 6galernent conpte des principes
6nonc6s par la CEAC en natibre tlrdvaluation deg tarifs internationaru passagerr
et narchand.isesl b eavoir Brtil fautlrait dtabtir et naintenir r.rn rapport prlus
6troit entre les ta.rifs et les co0ts.
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GREECE
t. The Clvll Avlatlon Authoutty le the regrulatory body of
ALr lrans;nrt Ln Greece.
2. Greece la a signatory menrber of the Internatlonat Agreement
on the procedure for the establlshment of, f,arlffe for scheduled
Air ServLceE whlch was slgned Ln Parls tn 196?. Thts Agreement
has been ratlfled by Greek Parll.ament as an Lnternal law.
3. AE far ae scheduled fares are concerned the procedures
provLded l.n the aforementloned A.gree*rent are usually followed. 
__
Packages of fares so aEreed are al-waye ftled wlttr CAA for coneLder-
ation and, approval and they are vaLLil only after they recelve
the offlclal approval of, CAA.
4. CAA when consLderLng lnternational f,ares tckes account of,r
a) The enl.stlng relatl.onshlp betrreen operatlng cost and
proposed leveL of fafes,
b) ottrer coherent fares whLch are applted by other carul,ers
ln the area,
c) the Lntereets of users of aLr transgnrt servlces,
5. CAA taklng tnto account the sal.d crLterLa may approve or
disapprove ln part or ln all or put reservatLons on certaj.n of
these fareg.
6. Any AlrlLner lntendlng to introduce scheduled fares devJ.atLng
from those agreed ln IATA and approved by C.AA or Ln cases of open
fare sltuatlon, always iras to submlt them to CAA for approval.
7. Sometlmes CAA on lts own LnLttatlve establlshes fareE whenever
the needs of the publlc (or some spee!.fic eatego::l-es thereof, students
seatnen, funmtgrants) seema to Nustlfy thon.
8. ft ls notad that no vJrltten gruldance e*lstg for evaluating
the levels and gtructure of aLr fares.
(5)
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Les conventions conctues entre Ie tvlinistAre des Transports
et tes compagnies adriennes nationates pour [a concession de
services adriens r6guIiers disposent que Ies tarifs pour [e trafic
adrlen tant nationaL qur internationat sont arret6s par Ie fvlinist0rc
suf propos i t ibn de I a soc l* 6 .
En ce qui concerne en particutjer trapprobation des tarifs int€r-'
nationaux, en sren remet en g6nCrat A [a procddure mutti[at6raLe IATA dorrt
tes 16sotutions, avant dr€tre avatis6es, sont cependant soumises I Ir'
approbat ion expresse prdcit6e..
' Des estimations ad hoc sont toutefois r€atisees notamment
Iorsque Ies niveaus ou Ies structr:res tarifaires proposds sravdrent
avoir une incidence 6conomique tr0s importante qui pourrait engendrer
des charges particutl0res pour les usagers ou avoir des effets
n6gat i fs.
Dans ces cas, t rAdmini;tration uti tise des crit0res spdcif iqr,les
drapprAciation qui font abstraction des accords IATA.
En ce qui concerne Ies propositions tarifaires retatives aux
accords entre transporteurs non grin6raLisds dans Le cadre de ta proc6dure
atuLti Iat6rate IATA, I rAdministration est intervenue A pLusieurs reprises
afin de modifier soit tes niveaux tarifaires soit les conditions de
transport proposdes par les transpcrteurs, en faisant abstraction de
ce gui sembtait Stra tt{nt{rlt imm6dlat Gt contingent de La.compagniie.
1.
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gtatutorY Position
The J-ega1 position on the process of tariff setting is that power
ie vested in tbe Minister {br Transport under tbe Air Navigatlon and
Transport A.ct, 1969 which provides that :
,tThe Minister roay in his absolute discretion applove or
refuse to approve of the fares or rates proposed to be
cbarged' for the carriage of passen6erst cargo or nail on
an air 6e:ntice tor from or within tbe territory of the
Stade. tt
Provision is nade in Bilateral Agreenents and' in tbe 196? fnternational
Agreement on tbe procedure for the establisbrnent of tariffs for
sched.uled^ air senrices, of which TreLand is a rnenber, for airlines to
consult and if possible reach agreenent on fares. fbere is also
provision for Aeronautical Authorities to consult in the event that
airLines fail to agree on tariffs and ultiuately if the need' arises
for a disputes procedure. freland supporls airline agreenent on fares
1516r.rgh the International Air Transport Association tariff setting
nachinery. Tariffs so agreed are subJect to the approval of tbe
' rcgplator:;' authoritY.
2. ACnini-stratige Position
The rinister has tr.d.itionally accepted fares agTeenents within tbe
International Air Transport Association Tariff Conferences, but in
the open rate situation wbich at present apclies on liorth Atlantic
routes,exaninationoffaresseekstoensurethepre.ventionof
predatorypricingtothedetrimentofyearroundsenrices.Tbe
exanination also sceks to ensure that the p:oposed fares neet the
direct and indirect costs in ttre context of provision of a year
round service. These criteria aLso apply to fares filings frou
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non IAIA airlines operating in Eulope. Each application ier exanined
on ita neritg.
LUXEMBOURG
forrte rlemancte rtrautorlsatlon <te tarlfs airrlons 6marrant
do cornpa.gnios a6rionnes doit obligatolrement 6tre adress6€
arr Ministire rles Transports, Servic e a6ronautJ.que, ii
Luxembourg. Apris un€ Jrremiiro analyse faLte Par no$-soinltIa demande ost tronsmlse pouf avis au1 s€1.vlco! Cornp6terrtr
do notre compagnle nationale LLIXAIII avant quo lo d5clsl,on
flnals n. folt prlq. par Ie ninlltlra.
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In principle, the establiehing of farea lc left to the airlinee. Eowever,
by a ro3aL decree all faree uust be app oved by the l,linieter of lbansport,
vho can dioapprovs faros which are congLdorod to bs urrcesonablo or ln oonfiltot
rttb thc regulrenentg of an econotrtcelly Juattfleblc operctton.
In the approvlng of fares, accowrt lo takerr ofr
l) tlc interegte of the travalllng publiol
2) the econoroic capacity of the airline; aarl
3) ttre lnpo:rtanca of a oobogrt tariff stnrcturc ln lnteraatlonal
air trangport.
!!bo lllntster of Tranrport can hlnsclf ortebltgh farcr ln thrrrc apcolfic
orSc!l
1) ff hc has dlsapprovcd farce flled by thc elrllnc;
e) lf alrllnog fail to file fa,rest and
3) fn epecial clrcunstances, thc l[inlster can fi: e fare
nlth apecific condltlonl, lrbiob <liffqe fron no::oar lgvslg.
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The Civil Avlation Authority (Cel) is the United Kingdom authority'whir:h hae
rcsponslbility for the ,econonic regsrlation of the U.K' civil avie,tion industry'
Its duttes in rolation to air eenricea apd fares are set out in tb,e citril
^lviotion Act I9?l as aDdrdod by the Ctvit Avietion Aot 1980, Seotione 3 antt ?JA
of, the lct state
lr3 
- 
(f ) it shall be the ctuty of the Authority to perforo the fumctircne
conferred on it otherwiec than by thie section in the nanner whictr lt 'oonslder$
le begt calculated -
(") to secure that Srltish airlines provid'e air transport servioes w'hich
satisfy all substantiaL categories of ptrblic denrand (so far as Britieh
alrlinoe m&y reasonably bo expected to provido such servicosl) at the
lowost chargee congistent with a high standard of oafety in
oporatlng tho servlces and an economio return to efficient operators
on the suns investod tn providing the gonrices and with socuring
the sound develoDuent of the clvll air traneport induotry of the
Unlted Kingdonl
and.
(t) to t\rther the reasonable lnterestg of users of air traneport services;
and in thie subsection ftBritigh airline'f neans an undertaking hav:Lng power to
provide air transport eervlces and appearing to the Authority to have tts
principal place of business in the United Kingd.on, the Channel Isl[ands of the
Iale of Man and to be controlled. by pereons who eitber are United Klngdon
nationals or are for the tiue being approved by the Secretary of iStats for the
purpos€s of thle gtrbsectiorr'. 1)
1) nrt soc aleo section 15 of the Civil Aviation Act I98O.
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(f) ft shall be the duty of the Authority to perform its air transport
licenoing functions in the manner which it considers ls bost calculatecl
to ensure that British airlines compete as effectively as possible
with other airlinee in providlng air transport services on international
routogt and in perforning thoae functions the Authority ehall aleo have
regard 
-
(") to any advice received. frou the Secietary of State with reopect
to the likely outcome of negotiations with the government of any
other country or territory for the purpose of securing any right
required for tho operation by a British airU.ne of any air transport
gorvioos outeide the Untted tGngdon;
and
(U) to the neod to Eecuro thc nogt effeotlve uae of airports uithin
the United Kingdon.
(Z) fn consid,ering whether to grant any air transport llcence it shall be
the duty of the Authority to have regard to the effect on erieting
air tranoport senricos provided by Eritich airlines of authorioing any now
sorvlces the applicant propose to provid.e under the f16orr"e, and. in any
caso where those otieting services are similaa (in terms of route) to the
proposed new services or rhere two or nore applicants have applied for
Iiccncee und.er which each propoees to provide similar services, the Authority
shal.l havo regard in particurar to any benefits which nay arise fron
anabring two or nore airltnes to provide the eervice in gueetion.
(:) Subject to section 3 of this Act and. to subsecti.ons (l) ana (2) of this
section, it shalr be the duty of the Authority in perforning its air
tranoport licenoing frnctions to have regard to tbe need to nfuiimlee
go far as reasonably practicable 
-
(") any ad.verse effectE on the crvironroent;
and
(t) any disturbance to the public;
froo noissr vibratlon, atroosphoric pollution or any other cause attrl-
hrtable to tbe uee of aircraf,t for the prtrposs of civil aviation. I
ANNEX 1.1s.
(+) fn aditltion to the ilutieg with respect to particular natters lsrposed
on the Authority by the preceding provislono of thie section, it ehall
be ths duty of the Authority to perform its air transport licenslng
frxrctlons in the rDanner which it considers is beet calculated to inpose
on the civil air traneport, industry of the Unitect Kingilon and on the
services it provides for users of air transport services tho nininru
regtrlctione consletent with the perfornanco by tho Authority of lts
duties undor Bections 3, 22 and.23 of tbig lct anct the preceding prc-
' vieioae of tbie goction.i
Section 13(1) of the Act imposes on tbe CAA the duty of publishing frgn
tine to.tino a statement of tlre policies it intends to persue in perforning
tte economic regulatory firnctions. On 28th April 1'98I in CA.l[ Official Record
Series 2, the CAI publiehed a formal gtatement of the policleg lt lnter:rds tct
fol,Ior. Para6raphs 19 to 22 tetet to pricing and stater
Hhcrever poooible the Authority uill all.ow market forces to eet or lnJlluence
the levels of.faree and rates for air transport. To the ertent that fflres &nd rlrL'
need to be controlled, the Authority will seek to enbure that users arel charged orrl
for thoso product featuree they require. The Authority aims progressirrely to
dlminigh discrinination and cross-subsidisation between routes and between Jlare
tlpee.Eachfareshoul'dberelatedtolong*runcostgatalevelwhichwillyield
eufficient rovcllrrue to cover the coetg of efficient operatione, including an
adequate return on capital. The Authority, however, recognises that Britislt
airllnee Day on occagion need to offer fares which are below long-nrn costE
|n ordc:l to natch compotitors or respond to a cyclical shortfall of donrand.
Scheduled eerviceg havE traditionally offered a consistently avairlable Pro-
duct with a high probability of obtaining a seat ai short'notice and a high
degree of flexlbility to the passenger, often together with intraline and
interllne facilities on multi-sectorn journeys. The luthority sees a rrafue
1n the maintenance and clevelopmernt of theee product. features to the extcnt
th:rt thore ls a eubutantial dernand for them. This does not presuppose that they
should be providetl on the present scale or by specific airlines. The ll'uthority's
teriff policy nnrat also crsuro that the costs of providing thera are ne1; by i;hose
,rlrO fcqutre thr:n.
Tho Authority wilJ, seek to ensure tariffs that are clear
It ains to help the travelllng public obtain e clearer picture
and
of
undrgrstandabl o.
the opt irrns
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avallablc. It bcllovco that prlco coopetltlon botueen elrli,nos should beneflt
ugors rather than internediariss.
Tho policies in para6papha 19 
- 
2f above should apply no less to donestic and
"ubotog" fares than to tnternational. The Authority will nake proposale for
changoa Ln tho rc6l.rlatory ayetcn ao aa to allor airlinee greater flexibility
end gulckor rcsponsc conslatently with nore effective and }eaa cu.obcrso!.
trrengolcnta for taking thr lntercete of ud6rs lnto account.
Therefore when congidering scheduled. fares proposed to it, to ths
I ertent that theee faree need to be controlled, the CA.[ takes as tho nain econoraic
crlterion the relationship of the fare to ite long-tero cost. The Authority
ior of coursor aw&rs that,nany factors oth€r than cogte lnfluence tbc aetting
of frrore arrd thegc arc also congidered.
The CA^|, has establlsheat e etandard procedurc for cvaluating faree
applicatlona. Since lt ls not possible to analyse every fare on every route
1n dctailr the Authority aelecte a e:vnple of routee for etudy. The United
Xi.ngdoo atrline ig ankcd to provide details of capacity, trafflc and revenue,
and costs for indivldual farc cate6ories on the seleot€d routoe, Froo th1e,
thr luthorlty aeaesres thc long-tern profitabillty of eaoh farc typc.
Tho Authorityra approoch to the evaluntion of E\ropoan faros is discussod
lrr tho publicotion frir\rropean air fares 
- 
e discussion docruentx (Cep AO9).
lpperdi,r ? of this docr.unent describes full.y the nethod of assessnent and tbo
lnforoation reguea$cd fron Uni.ted KinrSoo airlinos.
Thc Authority doee not normally intenrene in tho,setting of international
chartsr faree, but it revlews dovelopoente ln tbe cbarterr sector of tbe lnduetry,
snd uoulal teko. eotloa tf tblr bccane noocssary. I
ASSOCIATION OF
EUROPEAN AIRLINES
Ai'lrj( 2 |
c(E ):r158
20. lL. B0
AEA PRESENTATION TO THE EEC
Meeting of
Fares in
the Commission with
Europe to be HeId
National Experts on Air
on 24th November 1980
AEA is grateful for this opportunity to present its vi.ews on this
very complex issue of European air fares, (-rven thoucth we t{cre
.q<)mewhat .short of time to prcpitre ourselves aclequately for thisIlc','rriltq. AI,iA has on many occa:;ions prescnted verb;rl and writtt.n
cv j r.lcncn of our momber uirl incl;' vicws on Iiuropcan air f:alr{}li. Wo
can, for in,st;rnce, refor to our.study of air fares in liuropc rs.sued
rn L977, ;rnd which is now in ttr<-. proc_g_99.-_of__bg_in_g_Upgs!_gg. We can
alsoc1uotetheext-ensiffimittea-_ras[-veartotrreformer
RPRPTC Committee of t"he European Parliament. We repeat that it is
a l/ery complex is.sue on which many papers have been written and rt
wou]cl be rather dif f j.cult to cover now all aspects in detail. we
will therefore confine our.selvcs to a general statement outtining
our common posl-t1on, or even sometimes different points of view onthe main problems. We are of course ready to answer your questionsto t-ltr-'best of our knowledge. In view of our direct concern withthe.subject, may we also add that we wourd most wel-come the oppor-tunity to tre abre to follow the development of your rbview of
l'lttfolll;tn aif fafll;.
our remarks will refer to general economic and commerciar aspe,3ts
of air f ares and, to the extent that.. you may wish to examine rndetail the tarjlf_Oa.C-hinerv 
-it.sq_l f, r-nay we suqgest that you in,yitethe IATA Socretari;rt t-o deal wit-h this srrb ject-. AIIA is an assr:c i-
atlori of niheteen sihediilad European airriies, members of rATA,
and even though we cover a wide spectrum of airline activities. ou):Association is not involved in the tariff making process which is
covered worldwide by rATA member airlines within the Traffic
conferences. Needless to say, we are in full support of a mur.Ei-l;rtcral tar:iff co-ordination syst-cm.
llofore coming to specific air fares issues, it may be opportunr: to
rr:call that. Europc i.s by no means a homogeneou.s market like US
rlornr':it ic oParatrons, nor is t-hc linc aroa covering the whole oflJuropean operations. Moreover, as indeed underlined in the Conlmiss;j,on
Memorandum of rast year, European operations are only part of the
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total system of thc airlines. This provi,so is meant to un(lerlinethe fact that European air fare issues, being already difficult in
t-hemselve.s, in many cases they cannot be taken in i.solation fromthe ovorall air t-ransport context.
We would now likc to comment on the basi.s for your asses;smr-'nt,
which you have defined yourselves as possible fares evaluation
criteria. We believe them to be ageneral.ly reasonable formulationin a f j.rst stage f or the purpose of studying Iiuropean air f ares,
and they incieed point to many unclear and sometimes confficting
objectives which ouqht to be met. Such objectives are the target
of alI airlines, but the relative weiqht of, and priority for, each
of them obviously varies from one individual airline to another,
depending on its own geographical, marketing and economic position.
The relative importance of those criteria has also by nature changed
over timo.
As to the individual criteria which have been mentioned, our
observations are the following :
REASONANLE R[:I,ATIONS TO COSTS OF OPERATION
There mu.st . br' indr:ed such a rea.sonable relation between (-or;ts ancl
f ares AS d ee[er.11 ob-1ective. On t-he other hand, co-st al locatrons
are irn axtrcmely complex subject and many arbitrary elemonts are
i.nevr. l:;rhly involved j.n a cost allocation to route,s. problems at
that:;t-age sufficiently underline the extreme difficulties which
would;'rri,se in a cost alloration accordincf to traffj.c cat|g()ry and{arr'typa. Tlrerc-'al.so remains to define what a repres(-.ntativo co.st
w<lul.rl bc: on a ljJ)ccific route sj.ncrr the cost level on any c.1 ivon
route varies between the individual operators. This is for instance,
a factor which has been fully acknowledged in the ECAC study of
European air fares, which notes that to a very qreat clegrec oporatinq
co,.;t..i are a ref I r-.c l- j on of .the re.spec t:ivo nati.on;rI sit uat i on:;.Civt.:n t-he cf reat di f f erences encountered by the airl ines thomst. lvt s
in cost allocations, a strict aclherence to a thcort.t.icirl c,)..rt f ormula,
the purpose of which should enable authorities to a.ssess mathernatically
the cleqree of relatronship between fares and costs, can in fact be
defi.ned as a very ambitious tarqet of spurious accuracy, and would ln
I)ract j cr": rr:.sul.t in tr;rnsfcr to t-hr-. aut-.horitie.s thcm..;<:lvr-'.s oJ unw.rntr:cl
rer;ponrj ibil"i.t-y f or commcrcial dr:ci.sions in thc prico-rn.'rkrnq proces..r.
Apart from any technical arguments, we have to stress the fact that
operators have to look, not only at the operating costs in isolation,but at the cost of servicing all segments of the air market.
different al]ocation nethods give a d.ifference up to IA/o on routes
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A..-; ;l J inal rr,'mark on this item, it remains to be sacn how fo
ciefine what- is a hrgh fare or a high cost. On tl"re cost si<le,
not to.spe;rk of .studies carried ottt by nEA itself, examinations
by ECAC and by'tAI certainiy did not support any claim thall costs
of liuropcan airl.ines are too hiqh. Our poor prof itabil ity tltctrpoints to the fact that f ares are not excessive in rel;rtic'rn to our
cost level. We have also to mr:ntion t:hat .l large part of the
operating expenses is beyond the airlines' contro]. In I9'79 fuel
rcpresented 16/, of the total operating cost for European pitssenger
operations, and airport,/navigation charges another II%. Add to this
the co.st of personnel and over 60% of all operating expenrses 'were
outside the airlines' influence or offered very limited scope for
manoeuver. Final figures for 1980 are obviously not yet arrailable,but as an indication, the fuel bill may be as high as 30% of t,he
total cost,
REASONARLE PROFIT
We could not agree more with this statement, but unfortunately we
irrc f;rr from a profitablc intr;r-liuropt:an operation. T'here aro
ob'tiou.sly v;rriations bctween individual earrierrs, but t he over,,rll
picture for AEA airlines shows that in 1979 there was an operating
profit (rei,ation between operating revenues and operatinq expenses)
of 5.6%. This is before any allowance for financial chargeis and
return on capital , and there i.s a con.sensus in the inclu.stry th,at
at le;rsl, a 72.Y, f iguro ought to bc reacherJ. May we refer irr th.is
context to an AIiA examination of capital rcquiremcnts produced last
year, indicating that by the mici-B0s the accumulated value of
aircraft prircha.se systemwide will bc over 40 br-llion dollars? A
Iarc;e part- of those aircraf t order:s is required anyway to replace
prer;ently obsole..icent aircraf t in terms of f ue -l consumpt ion or
noi.se emission,^ apart f rom othcr potent j-al cost savlnos co:rlre'c te.l
with more modern aircraft. We calculated at that timo that- thr:
airlincs' r)wn cash generation worrld be only of the order o1' 13
biltion dollars, thu.s covering only a small proportion of the
necessary r.nvcst-ment, and we have to underline that this w;ts
assuming also a rea-sonable traf f ic growth of the order of tl%,
which we certainly did not achieve in 1980, since up to October,
traffic in Europe went down by 2% over the same ten month period
of 1979. This should be a sufficient illustration that excess:Lveprofits far from it are not made in Europe.
2.
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3. DISTANCE RELATION
Thcrc is in f ;tct- a reasonable overal l relation between f aros anddi.stance. The overall correlation between fares and stage <iistance
Jg, as we pointed out in our or^rn examination referred t-o above,higher than that betvreen costs and di,stance. This is certainry
a demonstration of the success of multilateral tariff co-ordinationin smoothing out not- only inequal ities bet-ween f ares f or ad j acent
routes, but also some of the large variations tn costs. There are
obviously deviations from the overall curve of fares versus distance
and they are due to specific economic, marketing and geographical
condition's within the overall European picture.
4. PASSENGER VOLUI']] RELATION
A.s indeed 1:or any type of produetion, costs and prices depend to
a large extent on the traffic size. Thi.s is again a general
criterion within which therc are bound to be many variation.s to the
theme. Iror in.stance, the question ha.s boen raiscd as to whether
thc hiqhe r costs per pa.s.senger on thin rout-es .should be rof lee tedj n the-' price. A f ir.st remark here r:ef cr.s to the dynamics of the
opcraLion, antl when ..;erving what is now a thin route, a carrier
obviorrsly <:xpeets to .show over medium/lonq term a reasonablc
traf f ic growth, and obviou.sly a strict pricc,/cost relation-ship
woul.d undermine the prospec ts f or traf f ic exp;rnsion on such routes .
Such a so-calLed'thin route'may also be required as a foodor
rot.l l:c. We mu.s t undr:rl ine acta in hr:re the f act that wL. wilnt to serve
aI! rnrtch as feal; ibIe the overall markct-, hoth rn torms of nctwork
re<lrrirement and market segments, and this may mean servrng also a
nurnbcr of routes which cannot be definecl as beinq, or likel1, to
become, profitable in isolation. There is not evidence that a
s;per:ialise<l carrir.r wi.th the so-callecl appropriate combinatron
of 'sm,;rlIil;h aircr.rf t and administrative ..itructure' would havelower costl; than a major carrier, and in any case we believe there
is a.strong case for his fare not to undercut the existing structure.
We have already explained at length our position on this subect in
our statement to the Hearing of the Transport Committee of the
European ParLiament on Regional Services.
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5. Two other critcria have been mentioned separately and whiclr
wc bclieve are closely inter-related. One is the is-sue of a broad
ranqe of f ;rres ancl the other i.s tho quest ion of simpl if ication and
tr;rn..;p;rrcnr:y. There i.s inevitably a conf I ic t betwcen tho.se two
ob jcr: ti vc:r;. Orr t lr<- one han<1 i t. i.s recoqn i.secl that airl inc's c.rt er
for a1l markct scc;mcnts, but thi.s should be furthcr clarified since,
bccau.sc of the cl-ose inter-reLation between routes in an;rirline
nctwork and withjn the overall- intra-European network, a carrier
caters not only for the market segments on any given route in is
isolation, but also for the requirements of multiple destinations
and interline passenger.s.
This remark again underline.s the case for multilateral tariff co-
ordination ancl i I I ur;t:rates t-hr: nocd f or a broad ranqe of f ares. On
t-hc ot:lrer lrand there is a prerequisj.te in any tariff .structure
servinq a wi dc rirngc of market .scgment.s that whrlst satisf ying
customer needs, promotional fares have conditions to maximise load
f actors and avoid yield ero.sion below prof itable leveIs, f ailinct
whictr the purpo.se of increa.si.nc; traffic and revenues would bedcf'catcd. Morr-'ovcr, t-ariff conrlitions within a multilateral framo-
work havc t-o cat<-.r for the requircments; of all airl"incs concerned.
Wr-' f uIIy recognisc that simpl rf rcation, and thereby transparency,
are our qoals: we constantly puriiue them, but the e are certainly
not. oasy to aehicvc. We can perhap.s also mention in this context
wlr,rl l;rr;t yr.',;rr'i.s Mr)morandum qucllc'd as ',.itranqe currcrxly effect..s'.
Ijrrr-:h el fects; art: il r ection of the monetary parities. They existfor all products and if it is accepted that any gitren commodity
bears different prices in different countries, vrhy not recognise
arr transport problems in this respect. Such so-cal1ed oddities
rr:f lect dif ferences in each country's purchasi-ng power. Yet airlrnes
try to smooth thr.m out as extcnsively as market consrclerations an,l
cconomics of operations permit and they are continuing their extcn-
.s i.ve cf f ort.s t-o reform the IATA currency system
'l'hc la..;t al;pect, wc would like to comment briefly on is the qurlstion
of serv j,ce-rclatcd f ares, which is also closely relatcd to the
above mentioned last two criterj.a. We have already dcalt with tht:
quc'rition of cohdrtions and restrictions. May we repeat again that,
the existence of a broad range of fares also implies such sets of
conclition.s.
Re<;arding the overbooking problem, it is certainly an over-
simplification to believe that the problem can be solved by charglngdirectly for the cost of reservation. Let us repeat once more that
the overbookJ,n<y qrrcstion is directly related to the Ino-show'
probl r,m, ;rnrl t.lr,rt: hoth thc travcJ ling publ.ic ancl thc intermed:i aries
arc t lrc m;r jor cu1prits in this respect. Ovcrbooking, which is
strictly controlled by the airlines, is a vJay of overcomi.ng the
'no-showt problem.
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CONCLUS ION
we hope that, with this brief presentation, w€ have been able toprovide you with a satisfactory picture of the main aspects of theEuropean air fares situation, and may we repeat again that we wouldbe most happy to co-operate further in the developrnent of your
examination.
: o0o
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CONSUMERS' CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
25 November 1980
Introductory remarks
1. Having heard Mr Ashton HILL of the United Kingdom Air Transpolt
Users Committee a month ago, you have today before you the Air Transp,crt
Workjng Party c,f the Consumers ConsuLtatjve Committee. The UK Committ'ee
has been speciaLizing in air transport matters for s'ix years. At the
European leve[, however, h,e stitt have a good deaL to Learn.Our purpr)se
today is to put to you certain common-sense observations from consumens
who are atso ain-transport users.
2. In our view, our task today js not to compare actuaL figures fon
fares. !'le assume that it is nobr more or Less generaLLy recognizecl that
the actuat LeveL of European air fares shoutd be revised. The 
"1j5lsnrl€of your Working Party is proof of th'is, moreover. lnle shal L L imit our-
seLves to discussing the criteria for evatuating fares contained in the
Commissionrs t^Jorking Paper. We aLso suggest two or three other criteria
which shouLd be added.
3,.[he curnent situation with regard to a'ir tllansport in Europe
In our view, the air transpont'industry suffers from overcapacity, with
the result that, where even a minimum of competition is possible, man;,
air Lines now tend to compete strenuousLy with each other. UnLess such
competition is haronious and conducted in accordance with wett-estabL'ished
and fair ruLes, the consumer does not necessariLy benefit in the Long
term. An ana[ysis of current fares, therefore, must take account of
current costs. These seem to us to be too hjgh at the moment in Europer.
It is in everyonets interests therefore to deaL not just with fares,
but 1,1jth the causes of the civiL aviation industnyrs probLems. Studies;
must be done on restructuring the whole industry, in order graduaLLy to
reach more nationaL, fares which refLect more rationaL costs.
Criteria for evaLuating fares
l.Fares shouLd reLate sensibLy to operationaL costs
(1) 9ygce!!_sg:!:
h,e are at"lare that, generaLLy speaking, current fares hardL:r aLLow
the airtines to make a profit, since current costs are exc!3ssive.
Ibs-rc!e!re!eUp-beg!se!-irdrvidse!-lere:-eld-ePet3!i9!3!-t:9:!9
It is cLear from the enormous difference which sometimes e:<ists
between the fares paid by different passengers for the use of
identicaL aircraft over the same route that individuaL fares bear
no re[at'ion to reaL costs. There is often a big difference between
the fuLL fare and Last-minute "pLane-fiLLing" fares. As airIines
Fa res
(ii)
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think prjmariLy in terms of Long-hauL fL'igcts, they often
consider European fLights simpLy as brhging passengers to the long-
hauL pojnt of departure, Sometimes passengers are carried beLow cost
'in Europe. To meek ends meet, ainLines often make other customers
not fty'ing non-hauL journeys compensate for these losses.
Our proposal for reforming this situation is given in point 5 below
which deaLs bJith the wide range of rates.
( i i i ) lqqqgpgr!-9e9te!19n9-99-pgb!Lg-9ctyr.gs9
We are aware that, if market forces were aLLowed to govern the
operation of aLL European routes, some of them wouLd no Longer be
operated since they woutd not be profitabLe. The problem is the
same as with the ra i lways. !'le ourseLves wonder whether estabL i shing
a cLose Link between fares and costs on non-profitabLe routes whichit is in the pubLic interest to keep open can be justified. We
reaLize that this raises the generaL probLem of competitjon between
private airLines which wouLd Like, as far as possibLe, to operateprofitable routes and nationaLized airlines" Thereis aIso the
probLem of whether the price of pubLic services accurately refLects
costs, a probLem with which aLL industries are becoming increasingLy
familiar. In our v'i ew, the most important step is to draw up an'i nventory
of routes in Europe which are ripe for competition and those which
are nonFprofitabLe. The probLem of regionaL and other subsidies can
be tackled Later. t''le do not agree, however, that losses on secondary
routes shouLd be borne by passengers fLying on profitabLe ones and
hav'ing to pay unduty high fares in order to offset [osses.
( i v) I!lgt!s!19!_9!_999!9
In order to establish a nelationship between fares and costs, the
Latter must first of aLL be known. !'le beLieve it is unreaListic to ask for
such information to be made avaitabte to the genera{. pubIic. A
discussjon on fares couLd perhaps be arranged between the airLines
and setected passenger representatives who wouId have confidentiaL
access to information on costs. Howcver, it is the authorities rather
than the users who are responsibLe for defg6{jng the public interest.
t'le know that some of you aLready have access to the necessary financiaL
information and, if we nay in turn put a question to you, we would
Like to know in which Member States such information is aLready
avaiIabte to the authorities.
2. Reasonable nnnf;+
It seems that most airtines are at present unable to buiLd up reserves
for e>-entiaL modernization. In our view a reasonabLe profit is essentiaLif research and other costs are to amortized. Defining what constitutes
a reasonabLe profit is a quite different matter.
In our view this is a generaL question which concerns much more than just
the air transport industry.
3. Relation to distance
Ee!c!i.ne-yertsq!e-9,99!e-!9-gl.s!q0ss
It is our view that it is possib[e to estabtish a retationship between
distance and variable costs, but not the fixed costs encountered in aLl
operations. However, the authorities must monitor the caIculation of
the different factors very cLoseLy, if no abuses are to be created.
(6)
(i)
(ii)
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In our opinion, the costs resuLting fnom the Lack of fifth freerlom
rights in Europe (hALf-empty aircraft and wasted energy) shouLd be
studied. In the current non-competitive situation, conceding fifth
freedom rights to airLines which aLready have operating rights, but
with no right to pick up at stops, could weLL introduce a LittLe
more competjtion and ratjonaL'ization, without there bejng any risk
of cut-throat competitjon.
4. Link with the number of passengens
(i) genec!i!ren-en-ltessets,v-la!hcc-lben-lergs
Unab[e to compete on price, canriers have tried to compete on
service and, mone particutarLy, on frequency. However, competit'ion
on frequency has often Led to empty seats, which increases the costs
of providing the service.Operators have often tried to"offer fl.ights at
about the same time, eLiminatin$ the benefits to passengers of nnore fLights
hlhether they ane a consequence of excess'ive frequency of dupLication,
empty seats mean first and foremost uasted fueL.
(ii) lfJlh-Jfeedgn-fightg couLd aLso improve toad factors
(iii) tsad_leglet_sga!i9!Lst
The Associatjon of European AirLines has such statistics. t'le wonder
whether they coutd not be used to improve forecasting at Commun'ity
Leve 1..
5. The wide ranqe of tariffs
(i) Introduction of basic tariffs
The foLLowing paragraph sets out one of our chief demands-
The current situation regarding the range of fares is as foLIows.
The user must start r,rith the fuLL fare, which is usuaLLy high; 1'rom
this he must t ry and deduct what he can to get the best f ane posrsibt,3r
and by his own efforts, sjnce no cLear information on reductions is
avai LabLe. He must nonmalLy frtLf i L centain conditions, wh jch by theiir'
very nature, or in accordance with commerciaL practice, often have
no direct bearing on the fLight contract, in order to benefit from a
bargain fare. t^le take the view, on the other hand, that, henceforth,
the basic fare should be set out and made known to the pubLic; to
this wouLd then be added the "extra"services, charged at a perce'ntage
of the basic fare. The extra services, i.e. over and above the basic
tare, wouLd 'incLude, in particuIar, advantages such as interchangeab'iLity
with other f L ights and ease of cancet Ljng.
(i i) lr.lplllrse!r9!-s!q-9!gtrlr
SimpLification and ctarity are panticuLarLy important today, for whal:is emerging in'increasingIy a singLe air transport market; there is
no Longer a cLear distinction between charter and scheduLed fLights,
or between business and tourist passengers. Everything is mingLed today,
and every user tries to get the best bargain.
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Hence the great need for information in this jungLe of rates and
conditions etc. Some encouragement can be drawn from the air[inest
growing awareness that it js in their interest to provide traveL
agencies with brochures that are as cLear as possible if they
are to attract customers. The airLines shouLd be made to do more
in this direction, and travet agentst heLp shouLd perhaps be soIicited.
t,Je suggest that the folLowing three criteria be added to those in
the Commissionrs paper:
1. Air traffic contnoL
( j) The probLem of mi L'itary areas
In vjew of the energy probLem, fLights shouLd be as
djrect as possibLe in our opinion, with the least delay
of Landing and take-off. We suggest, in particuLar, that
the question of mititary areas where overf[ying is not atlowed
to be studied. We regret that the Counc'it, repLying to
Written Question no 499/80 by Mr MORELAND in the European
ParLiament, shouLd have said it did not intend to incLude
this matter among its Priorities.
(ii) The future of Eurocontrol
We are aLl aware that EurocontroL is currentLy in
a bad way. At a press conference in Luxembourg on
13 November, the pubLic service unions pointed out
that, if air-traffic controL was to revert to nationaL
agencies once EunocontroI ceased to be active, costs
wouLd go up and air fares wouLd be affected. hle would
Like air-traffic controL to be studied as weLL.
2. Ai rport and other costs
l,rte red,ize that Landjng and other costs in Europe are cunrentLy passed
on in air fares. To clarify the situat'ion, we wouLd Like to see a
distinction between the fLight change and aLL airport and other
costs.Once this distinction has been made and the various costs
anaLysed, discussions couLd be heLd as to which of the infrastructure
and other costs should be borne by the Community and which by the
air transport users aLone.
3. NationaL pnestige poLjcies
In our view, lvlember States shoutd rethink these poLicies and try
and cost them. Let us quote just one exampLe. It appears that in
1980 there wiL[ be a deficit of + e iLLion for Concorde flights
between London and Singapone (solrce: Interavia "Courrier a6rien",
18 Novemben).
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EC Commission Air Fares Exarn"ination
With regard to the Commissionrs 13oCT80 working document:-
RE ITEM (3): Vle note with some surprise that the "UK Cascade Studyfl
lEETEaa t9f0l will be included in this examination. Non-schedulerd
carriers did not participate in this study. Considering the
preponderance of non-scheduled traffic in European air transpor-
tation, we recofiImend that the methodology and findings of the
Cascade Study be treated with serious reservations by the
Commission.
On the other hand. we would strongly recommend the independent St.trdyItComplementarity or Competition between Scheduled and Non-Schedul.ed
Air Transport" made by fTA, the Instj-tut de Transport A6rj-en in Paris.
The study carries the ITA reference 4 397/JLL,/MVIJL'NE 1976.
RE ITEMS (5) & (8): For further advice concerning criteria by which
to exemlte air fares, we recommend that the Commissj-on seek also the advj-ce
of tour operators and their respective organisations, and not only that
of travel agents. The latter will offer mainly the views of Europers
schedul-ed airlines, while tour operators have consid.erable experience
as regards both charter fares and scheduled airline group/bulk fares.
We woul-d encourage the Commission to contact the f .F.T.O. (fnternatiotral
Federation of Tour Operators) in this respect.
RE ITEM (8): Public service obligation is a much over-rated excuse
on the part of Europers state-owned carriers, and we question the
sacrifice ancl inherent non-profitability it implies. We would advise
the Commission to ascertain what routes and conditions are deemed
unprofitable by the airlines under this reference, and whether their
respective governments agree. In our opinion, both the public and the:
airlj-nes would be better served j-f such routes received direct governrrent
subsidies. If the public service obligation assertion j-s valid, the
amount of cross-subsj-disation should be analysed carefully and compareld
with the value of the service obligation.
At the same time, other air carriers should be given the opportunity
to provide the same service with a lower degree of subsidisation,
or indeed with no subsidy at all.
The whole issue wil-l be an important one, not only i-n rel-ation to
existing routes and fares, but also when the tariffs and conditions
of the Commissionrs proposed inter-reglonal servj-ces come up for
evaluation in the not-too-distant future.
EC Commission Air Fares Exami_nation
Monday, 24 November 1980
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RE rrEM (10): The r6le of ai-r transport in the community vis-d-visthe other modes of transport. The questions raised here are indeed
comprehensive and compricated, and we should like to offer for your
consideration some further views.
The amount of direct and indirect state subsid.ies must be taken into
consideration when comparing the various modes of transportation. Forinstance, trains are subsidised heavily, whereas private cars are
mostJ-y considered the object of taxation. on the other hand, the
cost of infrastructure, 
€ 
g roads, must be deducted in the same
consid.erations .
The same applres to airlines. rn general, airlines more than ful1ypay for their own infrastructure t e g airruays and. airports, and in some
cases even provide a surplus tirrough airport user-charges or directtaxation of air passengers. In most of the European Community,
charter passengers going abroad are made to pay a charter tax, inpraces up to 1400 Bergian Francs, that is not levied on other modes
of transportation.
It can also be argued. that the state-owned carriers receive hidden
subsidies by virtue of the monopoly they enjoy in the marketprace.
RE ITEI'IS (11)-(20): We do recognj-se the difficultj_es involved indeciding the criteria by which to evaluate air fares, but we would
submit that the task is not so complicated as it may seem and. some
airlines wish to contend.
The Commission has at its disposal the best possible "yardstick"for measuring fares, namely the true cost related point-to-pointfare offered in an open international market by the Communityts
independent air carriers. This fare alIows a modest, reasonabl_e
return on investment to an efficient operator, and the fare can easilybe checked from tj-me to time by solj-citing tenders from ACE member-
carriers.
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relationship to the cost of operations
eval-uating fares, and should always be
costs of an efficient carrier. Since
can be carriEd-fi-Elition to a normal
criteria should be based on norrnal-load
the revenues from mail and cargo consideredThis will make fare comparisons possiblediffering loads of mail and cargo or
RE ITEI{ (f 2) 3 A reasonableis the primary criterion for
observed bearing in mind the
mail and cargo in most casesload of passengers, the costpassenger flights on1y, and
an additional contributi-on.
between carriers that carry
no mail,/cargo at all.
Allocation of costs to each single fare type is indeed very cumbersome
and in our opini-on not necessary. Under fiee market condilions there
would be no need to control fares, since corpetition would ensure thatfares are not too high, and that exce.ss revenues are not availablefor cross-subsi disation .
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In the absence of free market conditions in Europer the predominant
on-demand fare t.ype (in Europe normafly the economy-class fare) shoul-'f
be linked closel.y- to the costs of an efficient air carrier inpoint-to-point t.erms .
RE ITEM (13): We can ronly re-iterate our view that European
;FTr"""p"rtation should be managed as a normal rrfor profit"-
business concern, with investments obtained through the normal.
free-market financial means. Any aspects of the business conside,red
a'public service obligation" should be accounted for separately
and subsidised separately if absolutely necessary'
RE ITEM (14): If fares are related to point-to-point costs of.anL
aEEGTent carrier, as this Association is recommending, they will
automatically become closely related to distance'
RE ITEM (15): When air transport operations are properly adapteil
ffi votqme of traffic in a rnarket, there is no reason to expect
fares to be significantly higher than in dense-volume markets' Crbviously'
the type and size of the aj-rcraft must be gauged to achieve a satis-
factoi! service-frequency while preserving an economical load factor'
Under no circumstances should improper equj-pment t e g too ]arge eLn
aircraft, be permitted to justify higher fares.
RE ITEM (16): The aim of the existing broad range of fares isGtrlrafly to obtain the highest possibte load factor and revenue
at a givEn leveI of producLion Uy utilising afl exlsLing prefererrces
of the public. Since this wilI also mean the best util-isation of:production factors, dj-fferentiation of fares should at least in theory
produce the lowest costs.
RE ITEM (]7): Complaints by leisure and VFR travellers are guiter
Gd6EsEEnEE6Ie, since the scheduled air fares for this clientele are
l-aden with restrictions to prevent usage by business travellers ' on
one hand, and beefed up to cover privileges the traveller may not,
necessarily desire, such as interchangeability and the privilege
not to show up for a flight without any risk of penal-ty. Charter:
fares for this same clientele are similarly burdened with government*
imposed restrict.ions.
The real victim, however, is the business traveller who j-s forceil
to pay whatever fare the airlines may demand, including subsidies
to leisure travellers.
We should perhaps encourage the Commission, on thj,s question of
relating fares to services rendered by the airline, to devote tinLe
to considering ways in which airlines could practically separate
the aspect Of an air ticket from the aspect of a seat reservationL;
with a view to treating the latter as a non-refundable option. Such
a fundamental change to the basis of European on-demand air transrPort
could have profound effects upon the evolution of European airIransport.
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RE ITEMS (19) & (20): Simplification and differentiation are just
not compatibre factors. Again, the only rear solution is increased
competition, as this alone will produce the right combination ofdifferentiati-on (i e lower prices) and simplification (i e thepublicrs ability to comprehend the various fares and associat6d
restrictions).
rn concl-usj-on, ACE submits that the need for public approvar and
control of air fares comes basicarry as a resurt of the absence of
competition, and also as a result of non-adherence to fundamentalpri-nciples in the Treaty of Rome, i e the right of establishment
and the rules of competj-tion.
No amount of public control will be abl-e to substitute for competJ-tion,
and we therefore suggest that immediate steps be taken to increase the
scope for competition in air transport serving the European Community.
whilst the opening up of new inter-regj-onal air services can become
a step i-n the right direction towards more corTpetition, it cannot initself be sufficient to secure a reasonable fares structure on aflthe important trunk routes. we therefore point once again to the
suggestions contained in our 30Nov79 opinion of the commissionrsCOM(79)3II memorandum. These suggestions were, as follows:-
A) rtThe introduction of rpart-scheduledr rights on charterflights, in order that a portion (e g 50E) of all seats
may be sold to the public without artificial restrictions
as to land arrangements, length of stay, return fti_ght, etc.Such rights would. only be a natural counterpaft to the 'part-charterr privileges already enjoyed by scheduled carriers."
B) "A general l-iberalisation of existing charter regulations to
rel-ax or remove current constraints and restrictions, such asthe requirements for land packages, advance purchase, minimum
stay and group sizes, and to al-low for mixing of various charter
types on the same flight. "
We tender these suggestions--again--in view of the fact that overhaLf of European air traffic is presently carried. in the charter mode,
and that pt:ogress towards low-cost European air transportation has
always originated in this sector of the industry.
On behalf of the Association and all its member-carriers, I shouldlike to thank the commission for this opportunity to air ACE views
on this matter. We look forward. to working closely withthe Commission on this, and every other issue affectingthe future of European air transportation. Thank you.
Yours sincerely,
A Vernieuwe,
Secretary-General- .
-l-
ANNEX 5.1 .
Technlca} procedures of the
Prorating is a system of sharing the revenue between airlines
with an interline agreenent of a passenger who travels on a nulti seotor
journey with one ticket.
Tr,,ro d.ifferent nethod.s exist for the calculation of the share that
each airline gets fron the total price of the ticket '
First there are rates based. on the Multilateral Prorate Agreement
(frlpl,). [Lre method. is called "@' (Snf). [Lre r5,APl
is based on the flight coupons. For each sector of a journey the ticke'l;
contains a flight coupon.
The first step is to take the sum of the local one way (norma,l
econony) fares for each sector (coupon).
Sca.nple
1)Route nTuTcToTt
Local one way fares ?O 40 BO 6o Sun = 25O
2) Suppose total ticket price (throughfare) = 150
16f) r 25Q z^zl3) Ih" prorate factor = W = 6V/o
4) ftre prorate value or the share for each airline is calculated" a;s
follor'rs:
sector A-B=6q"of lO=!2
B-C=6@"ofQO=2Q
C 
- 
D = 6q" of BO = 48
D 
- 
E = 6V/" of 6O = 36
Total *
The prorate d.ilution for each airline is in the IISRPT nethod. tlte sane
.^nl.n tnls CA'se 4lI/o.
Ihe second nethod. is virbually the sa,ne be it that some airlines -
rnainly those with a d.onestic network - do not accept the fuII dih:ttiont
or amy dilution fron prorates. These airlines have supplenented. d.ermand.s
called" rrprovisorr or trrequirementstt .
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ftca.ople prorate calculation with proviso /requi renent
Route reroains A 
-- 
B 
- 
C 
-- 
D 
-- 
E
Suppose the airline operating or the A 
- 
B sector deroa^nds the full local
fare (7o).
1) flrrough fare was f5O
subtract 
_Jg
for the other airlines 8O
rena].n
e) Sr:rn of the renaining local fares
=25O-J0*IBO
3) n" prorate factor = %# = 44.45f"
4) ttre prorate value for the renaining airlines is
B 
-- 
C = M,45/o of 40 = 18
c __ D = 44.45% of BO = 35
D-E=M.45/oof60=27
Sun ;
The prorate dilution of the airline serving A 
- 
B u V/o at the expense of
the other three airlines whose dilution goes up fron {So fo 55.55fo,
In general prorate d.il-ution increases
- 
when the nr:rnber of flight coupons increases
- 
when sectors with ftreguj-rementsfr are includ.ed. in a nulti sectorjourney
- 
when the rrthrough farefr becomes lower in conparison with the
sector fares
- 
when sectors are incLuded with a relatively high level sf looal
fares compared. to the other sectors of the journey.
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ANNEX 6 J.
rrRevergerr Cascadell
Introductioa
The difference betseei scheduled aad cherter fares 1argely reflects the relativel5r
higher costa of scheduled operators. Eoveve:, higher costs do not necees,arily
inply thai scheduled operators arc Lesa efficieatr since like nust truly iba conpared
uith like. ft is Decessa.ry to allow forthe cost inplications of intriae:ic
differenees between the scheduled end cha:ter roodee'befo:e draving any co:aclus:ions
about conparative efficiency.
The main objective of the study rrhich is des:ribeC in this paper wa6 to d,gternlncjust how Ia:rge a differential bef,*eeu charter and scheduled costs night reaaonably
be expected in ihe absence of any efficiency differences. In conncn with earlier
sinilar studies, the basic nethod of approa:h uas to ideniify those produr:t
features which were exclusive to each 6ode and to a66e6s their cost irnpli,oatio:as.
There is an important difference however between this an<i previous etudieis. Tnis
study considered the costa which a charter airline would incur if it vere to offer
a schedul-ed-quaiity product. hevious studies considered the costs uhich a
acheduled airline rould iacur if proviriing a charter-quality product. Co:asequently
the result.q of thie study are not on]-y veluable in thenselves but also fo:r contrasting
rgith those of earlier studics.
Data Base and Hethodology
The UK charter aj-rlinc to vhich this stuCy relates provided a fairly detailed
breakdown of the costs for a round-trip operatiou to popular Mediterranean
deetinations in March 't9?8t
The nethodology adopted vas broadly the tarte as that used in the earlier studies
and exenplified by the joint tsritish Ainraysftivil Aviation Authority ttCascadert
studies. Ilowever, rrnlike the earlier rtCascaciefi t;rye stu<iies this study defined
charter rather than scheduled cos'l per pa66enger a6 its index basel and instead
of cascading dovn to ihe charter proctuct cascaded up to the scheduled product cost:
hence rtReverge Cascadetr.
lhe charier route costing data was used to derive a charter eost pel Fasseager
reflectiag an assumed aeat factor of 85%. Systenatic adjustnrents were tir,en nade
to appropriate elenents of this cost in ordei to al1ov for intrinsic diff,erenc.es
between the charter and scir.eduled nodes. Each of these adjuotments wa6 r,epreeented
as a separate step'."ia the rrlle..'er6e Caocaderr. These adjustrnenta ale described in
the following section.
CerLain tectrnical. aspects of the cassade approach are worthuhile nentioai'ng at
this point. Firstly, a)-i;horigh this approach involves'ey-asining the implir:ations
of specific modaf- differences for each.cost area separ.ately and thc cost,sreas ere
fairly rrarrowly defined, ii is not e-lvays pcssible to be precise aboui the extent
bo which certain eost areas need bo be acljrrsted to reflect a nodal differ,erce."
Secondlyr each step in the cascade represents the cueulative effect of al-.t those
ntodal differences up to and incl-uding that bcing consiciered. Consequen:1,y, it is
preferable for those adjustrnents which involr'e naking possibly arbitrar.y essurlp'cions
aboitt certain costs to occur in the latter part of the cagcado. Thirdl-y, i.t foUor'rs
that a difference in the ordering of the adjustrnents na;r weJ-I produce a s.Li"ght
variation in the cascade iodices. Another consideraticn is variations asisociated
with rounding.
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The Modal Adjuetnente
!-s already stated, the index base for rtReverse Cascadert was defined as the charter
cost per pasaenEer relating to a popular llK-ilediteranean route and an assuled
seat facior'of 89%. The adjustnents contained in the earlier British Airwqys'/
Civil Aviation Authority rr0ascadetr stu*ies vere recognised as being a conpreheusive
a:rd logical classification of a]-J- possible scheduled,/charter modal differences.
.{ccordinglyr the rrCascaderr adjustnents uere considered and adopted where appropriatein rrReverse Cascaderr. It will be aoteC however ihat the ordering of ihe adjustnents
ras altercd elightly so that the nore controvereial adjustnents were placeci torards
the l-atter pa:rt of the cascade. The nFeverse Cascaderr adjustnent steps arc
<iescribed beLoy.
Step 1 Not Applicable
This adjustncnt relatcs to tvo naia areas: eales, reserrations and adveitising
costsg cargo revenue and bar profit.
An estinate of the additional costs rhish the charter airline night expect to
incur if it retailed scheduled airline tickets vas obtained on the basis of aCviee
frou other bodies within thc industry rith direct experience of performing sinil-ar
functions. The sales, reservations and advertising elenent corprised by far the
greatest part of ttrc rrNot applicablerr adjustneat.
The cargo revenue and bar prcifit elenent vas included to reflect the nei, effect
of the freighi-carrying capability which is exclusive to the scheduled noCe and the
relativel-y higher level of on-board sales typical of cherter seryrsces. The
cost inplications of these tuo opposing inflLueaces u'as ca-l.culatcd as a sna1l
increase in charter costs. Ihat is, the lover (ie scheduled node) level of bar
profits wes not expected to outweigh the cargo revenue vhich night be expected to
accrue if revenue freight tra.ffic nas a]lowed on a charter service.
Step 2_Sjaadards_
This adjustnent wa-s inteaded to reflect the additional costs involved in upgrading
charter hanCling and in-flight services to scheduled quality. The additicnal
hanCling costs were obtained fron quotations by conpanies already providing handiing
services for scheduled airlines at the airports at either end of the rrReverse
Caseaderr route.
The costs involved in inproving neal standards and customer services in general(eg toys for children, in-flight reading naterial-, training cabin crew in the use
of ABC Ainrqys guides etc) nere estimated by the charter airline itself.
SieP J Utilization
This was recognised as being onc of the nost controversial steps in the cascade.
fn the earlier rf0ascaderr studiee it was assurned that the level of utilisation
achieved by air.Iines operating charter services was likely to be sor'e 25% higher
than that achieved by airlines operating scheduled services and that the cosl aree,s
ANNEX 6.3.
Eo6t likeLy to be affested rould be aircraft depreciation and fixed creu costt;.
The effect of a reduced Level of utilisation nas aleo calculated on the trasis of
a 25% modal- difference for rtReverse Cascaderr, However, uhereas in the rr(lascacletr
stuciies aircraft depreciation end fixed crew costs llere conaidered the only il;ens
affected by'this aCjusiment, in ttReverse Oascadert it nas also considered appropriatc
to adjust for the effec'" upon i"raterest chargesr aad adninistration and operatj.ons
eupport cost6,,
Utilisatiou and average stage length are undoubtedly interrelated" Eowel'er, :rlthough
ionger stage lengths almost invariably permit higher utilisationt it is by no lteano
cjear tirat utilisation nust inevitably be lover for the scheduled mode. It v:ts
decideri therefore to explore this aspect in nore detail.
The link betreen 
"or"*" stage lcngth and aircraft utilisatj.on hae been lloroal-lyexpressed in various studies of airline cost. Cost models developed by llawker
Siddeley and the Group of Six each incluCe a fornula expressing anaual ajircraJlt
utilisation aE a funciion of, block tine. These fornul-ae were used to der:iveItpredictedrt levels of aircraft utilisaiion for a sanple of UK seheduled and charter
airlines based on average bLock tine data for 1977i Al-though the tro for:nulae
gave slightl-y different resulte for each of the airl-ines involveci, both lfornn-rlae
shrowed a variation of sorne'12 percent between theanual- utilisatioa ilpredictecill
for British Ai::*ay.sr short-haul international sbheduled operations and that ilpredictedr'l
for the rtReverse Cascade[ airline?s chalter operations. fhi.s finding oilviour;1y
ra-ised doubts abour the val-idity of the ?5 percent variati.on aseuned in the ttOascaderr
studies" "Predictedrt uiiiisation levels were theu conpared vith thoee actuallly
achieved b;r each of the sanple airlines. The differences between actual and
preiicted values suggested that charter airliaes obtain nore utilisation than caa
be erjS-ainec!. by their longer average stage lengths, These findings coulci onl;r
coniirro the dlfficulty oi reaching firn conclusions in this area. Ii uas doc:Lded
therefore to investigate just how sensitive the trR€verse Cascadert indices uere to
changes in the util.isation assunption. The tro alternative utilisaticn assunptions
aCopteci for thie purpose were firstly, the 2l percent charter,/scheduled diffe::entiaL
previousiy refered tol and, secondly an assunption of no nodal difference in
utilisation.
Steo 4 Seat Factor
Tlre charter cost per passenger index base relates to aa 85* seat factor. TLre
pru'pose of th:Ls adjustmeni step uas to aflow for the relati.vely lower seat factors
generally achieved on scheduled services. In comvnon uith the earlier studies,,
this study assrined a scheduled node seat factor of 55 percent.
The cost area,s considered likel-y to be affecteC by the seat &.ctor adjustrnent
!rer..e flight-related <iirect operating costs and fixed costs. Accordingll/, all costs
otlrer than those which were identifieri as being purely passenger-relaied had ilo
be opread oven r'ewer passengers. This cost-increasing effect wao only sltightly
offset by the estj-mated saving in fuel resulting fronc the inplied pqyloacl redtrction.
AUry€r__6-4.
ltep f S"rti"e D""BiW
The aircraft uged by the |tReverse Cascadert airl-ine were in JOtt seat pitch coufigu.-a-tion. A scheduled standard eeat pitch of Jdtt rrae assurned in order to nake the
eeatiug density adjustnent. The cost areas affected wera the aane a.B those
dcscribed in Step 4 above.
Step 5 Peak/lbgugh Ratio
this adjuetnent nas included ia the rrCascadert atudies on the grounda that, because
scheduleci operators are less trpeeilqrtr tha:r charter operators, charter operaiors
are at a cornparative disadvantage in having fer*er rraite of ouiput over which to
spread certain fixed costs.
Th'e peak/trough ratio adjustnent was one of the nost controversial. rt rras
noted that this factor night have already been accounted for in the utilisation
adjustment. It was also noted that the respective tinings and peak days of the
servi.ces operated by the two t5ryes of operaior rroul-d deternine the size of arypeak/trough adjustnent rhich was indeed considered. necessary. In addition, it vas
recogaised that charter operators were probably nore able to hire tenpo::a::y staff,
schedule major engineering vork and staff holidqys auqy from,the peak and lease
out spare aircraft in ihe winter. The coatroversial nature of this arijrstmani
inCicated that it should be left u:rtil touards the end of the cascade, Fur-ihernore,
because the cost inrplications ot' any peak/trough differeuces ere so difficultto quantify, it was decideci to show the effect of two alternaiive peak,/trough
rati-o aesunptions. It vas assuned firstly, that charter costs shoul-C be reciucedby (" purely aotionaf) 9J per passenger, and secondly, that no peak/tr.ough ratio
acijustment lras necessaryo
Step 7 Comission
Connission costs are specific to the scheduled node. The normal commission rat.:in March 1!/8 was 8 percent. f'he rrReverse Cascadert commission cost adjustnrea! ves
calculated by taking 8 percent of the totai charter costs p€r passenger afier
adjusting for Steps 1 to 5 (inclusive).
The Results
The rrReverse Cascadert indiceo are shown in Table i below. liiose i: col'.r.rn f relateto the 2J percent utilisation adjustraent discusseC uader Step ) a;rql the nrrtir;naf-peak/trough allowance discussed under Step o. Those in colun:r Ir shqw lhe effect
of ornitting both the utilisation and the peak/trough ratio adjustnents ei-taqeflier,
Table 1 rrReverse Cascadert
Colunn I Col-Lmn II
Charter cost per pax
Not applicable
Standards
UtiLisation
Seat Factor
1
a
3
11
100
118
111
141
191
tui-.,
118
1-ie
135
178
Table 1 rtReverse Cascaderl contin.
Colunn I
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Co1um ,iI
, Seatirg Density5 PeaVfrough Ratio
7 Cormission
Derived Sqbaduled Cost per Pax
211
nt
219
197
197
214
214219
11ne difference betvreen the charter and derived scheduled cost indicea insp1ies
that,, even aasuming no efficieucy differencee betvteen the ti'-o nodesr one nigh!
expect id' find scheduled co6t6 (and therefore fa-res) sone 11O to 12O pe:rcent
higher than charter costssreD on the sane route. rrRaverse Cascaderr also,ienon,strates
that by far the most important single adjustment is that relating to nodal
differences in seat faclor. Thls adjustaentalone probably accounte for ,sone '4O
percent of the totaL seheduled,/eharter cost difference.
Cosrparison rith Other Studies
The only other study with which it ie at al-l possible to conpare ttReverse Cascaderr
is ihe Route C ttOascaderr study conta-ined in the Civil Aviaiion Authorityr-s European
Air Fares docunent (CAP 4O9). It nust bererphasised however that the two etudies
a.re not strictly conparable. Indeed, it ras first Eecessary to recalculate the
Route C ciai,a to reflect the ordering of the |tReverse Cascaderr adjuetuents and to
ocii the edjustnent relaiing to First Class facilities on the schedul-ed :node (ie
the Tourist class adjustnent in the rrQasgadstr studies)' For this and techaicaL
reasons of the kind nentioneC earlier, this inplies that the reviseci indices rnay
not be entirely compatible rsi'uh those ia the original rrCascaderr. Furtherrnorer the
base data r'or these two stuciies reflect costs at different periocis in time; ihe
routes are very similar but not identical; and there are ceriain differences between
the tuo cosi breakdowne. Nevertheless, it is useful to show the revised rrCascaderr
and rrReverse Cascadert inciices together when attempting to draw some broad inferences
about the pr"ineipal sou:ces of scheduled,/charter cost differences. The tvo sets of
indices shown belor,r both include the effect of a 2J percent utilisaticn difference
a:rd an allowance for a peak/trough ratio difference.
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Table 2 lrCascadetl and llRevelse Cascadett
rrReverse Cascaderr rrRevised ) rf Cascadef l
Rorrte C
36
4o
40
55
64
66
92
97
45
45
5t
&
64
86
96
)
4
Charter cost per pax (actual)(derived)
1 Not Applicable
2 Staadards
Utilisatioa
Seat Factor
Seating Density
PeaklTrough Ratio
Conmission'
Scheduled cost per pax (actual)(derived)
2
6
92
100
g1
100
Both rfCascaden 
'nd rtReverse Cascaderr i.ndicate that there is likely to be a verJrsubstantial variatioa between scheduled and charter costs, even igncring anyefficiency differences that night erist. The variation indicated by ttReverie
cascaderr is, however, sonewhat snaller than that indicated by rcasclcler. rhe
nost significant single adjustment in both stuciies is that for seat factordifferences between the two nodes: 22 perceniage points in trReverse Cascaderr
and 25 percentage points j.n ffCascadeil.
fhe most striking difference between the two siudies is the inportance whicjr is
attached to those faetors included in the rfNot Appli-cablert adjustrnent step. A1
adiustnent of 1J percentage points is shown in rrCascadett in contrast to tie 8percentage point'difference shown in rtRe"erse Cascad.err. llne uuCerLying cost d.ata
were exainined and it uas found that this difference coul-d. be largely eryl.ainerJby two factors. l'irstly, theitReverse Cascarler! charter airlineri ettimates of whatit would cost to retail the siheduled prod.rrct were consiclerably lorver than thoseactually incured by the ttOascadert and other scheduled. airlinei. Neverthelessthe charter airlinets estimates were accepted as being cor.viacing. This raisesthe question of whether the fairly high sales costs incurred by iost Eurol:ea:r
scheduled operators really are attributable to methods of selli.ag that a-r.e indeedintrinsic to the scheduled node. T'he other facior which accounts for the largertllot Applicabld?adjustrnent shown in trCascaderf Has the inclusion of a noticac,j-
allcwance for the cost implicatione of aly aircraft equipment ctifferences r+hichqight exist between Echeduled and chartar opercrtions. 
. :,1., ,
ANNEX 7.1 -
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Advance purchase(epsx) excursion
AEA
AEA Menber Airlines
Available seat-ki lometres
AvaiLable tonne-kilometres
Average revenue yield
Common rati.ng
Discount fares
t\JJlr-uTr"on \y]-er,l-/
A discomt fare on sched.ul-ed services for
which purchase is required by a specified.
tine in advance of d.eparture. The fare, may
contain other special conditions.
Associati.on of Europeanr Airlines
Aer Lingus, Air France, Alita1ia, Austrian
Airlines, Sritish Airways, British Caledon:Lon,
Finnair, Iberia, Iceland.air, Yuloslav Airl:Lnes,
K,M, Lufthansa, Olympic Airways, Saben.a, S.l\S,
Swissair, TAP, t\.irkish Airlines, UTA.
A seat-kilometre is available when an airc::aft
seat is flown one kilometre. Avallable seat-
kilometres may be calculated by multiplyinlS
the number of seats available for sale on a givenflight by the stage distance.
A rnetric tonne of available payloacl space lllown
one kilornetre. ft is caLcul-ated by nultipll.ing
the number of tonnes available for the
carriage of revenue load. (passenger, cargo and
mail) on the flight by the stage d.istance.
See t'Yieldtr.
Is the fact that the sa,me fare applies frour
one origin point to several ad.jacent desti-.
nation points.
Any fare other than nonnal fare.
The difference between a point-to-poin'b
- 
sector 
- 
fare a;rd the actual revenue earned
per passenger traveJ.ling at that fare 'bype.
Means the shortest all-year route operate,iin both directions between only two po:Lnts.
Direct route
Extra mileages
Fare
Fare construction unit(rcu)
Inclusive tour (IT)
Interline passenger
IATA
ICAO
Ind.irect route
Load factor
Local Europe Operations
A unit of account used for
calculati-on purposes, based
of the US dolIar.
A scheCuled fare available
package tours which include
fare construction antl
on the pre-l)]2 value
for constructing
accomnodation etc.
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The fare paid for a journey on a d.irect route
usually includes an allowance for mileages in
excess to the direct route distance (t>/r) which
enables the passenger in nanJr cases also to use
an indirect route with a longer distance.
The price to be paid for the carriage of passengers
and baggage a,nd the conditions und.er which thoseprices apply.
A passenger using a through fare for a Journeyinvolving two or more separate flights and two
or more camiers.
fnternational
International
Air Transport Association.
Civil Aviation Organisation.
Means alqr scheduled continuous air route other
tha.n the direct route.
In this report it i-s sJmonJdnous to revenue
passenger load factor, which is the pereentage
of seating capacity which is actually sold and
utilised. It is computed by dividing revenue
passenger-kilometres flown by available seat-
kilometres flown on passenger senrice.
Include all international routes originating and
terminating wi.thin the region conprl-sing geographical
Europe (inclucling Iceland and USSR to f-ngitu,Le-
55oE), Algeria, Azores, Canary Islands, Ma"teira,
Marocco, Tu.nesia and f\rrkey.
A journey inclutling more than one sector not
being a return trip on one route.
Multi sector journey
Net passenger cost
Nomal fare
Operating ratio
Peak/trough ratio
Pro-rate
Refund
Revenue passenger Load
factor
Revenue passenger 
-r PAX
Route
Sales, Cornnission
Seat factor
Seating density
A11 passengers counted. on
as carrieC af 2J/o or more
fare for the journey.
a point-to-polnt basis,
of the nornal applic:ab1e
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Is the total operati-ng costs for the sched.uled.
passenger services less the revenue rece:Lvetl for
the carriage of freight and nail on those services.
The full fare established for a first or tourist/
economy class service.
Is the relationship between operating rerrenues and
operating expenses, computed by dividing opereting
revenues by operating expenses (including financial
charges / .
A measure of the seasonal variation of serrvic,as
operated. by air carriers.
See annex ).
Repa;rment to the purchaser of all or a portion of
a fare, rate of charge for unuseJ carria6;e.
The percentage of seating eapacity which is actually
sold and utilised. Conputed by dividing r'evemre
passenger-kilornetres flown by available seat-
kilometres flown on revenue passenger services;.
Scheduled se:rrice provided by an airline betweren
two or more cities with the sa.me f11ght.
Is paid by the airlines for the sale of air
transportation documents to the agents (travel.
agents or other air carriers).
See "Load. factorrr.
A term indicating the standartl of seating on alr
air"craft. ft is nor"mally measured. by the distance
between rows of seats, and the number and size of
seats in a row.
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Sector Taken to be synonJmous with 'tstage flightn, i.e.
from take-off to the subseguent revenuo landing.
Scheduled serwices Scheduled flights performed according to a published
.timetable, or so regular or frequent as to constitute
a recognisably systematic series which are open to
use by the public on an individually ticketed basis;
extra flights oocasioned by overflow traffic fron the
scheduled flights and preparatory revenue flights on
plarueed air services.
Stage An aireraft journey between a take-off and' the
subsequent revenue landing.
Stage distance Is the airport-to-airport great cirrle distance.
Station costs The cost of naintaining staff and facilities at
airports for handling passengers an'l aircraft.
Stopover Equivalent to the term 'rbreak of journeyfr. Adeliberate interruption of a journey by the
passenger, agreed to in a^ivance by the cami-er,
at a point between the place of d-eparture and the
place of d.estination.
Tariff In this report synonymous to fare.
Through fare (or The total fare (or route) fron polnt of departure
route) to point of destination.
Tioketing Issuing an air transportation tlooument.
yield (passenger) The passenger yi-eld is the total revenue received
for the carriage of passengers dj-vid'ed either by
the total nuruber' of revenue passengers carried or
revenue passenger-kilonetres ff own.
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BRUSSELS 
- 
ATHENS return fares
The followinc return fare structure with aesociatetl conditior}s aDnIie,l 1.I.1o8!
Note the firet class anil eoonomy fares are also available on single trip fares
at half the quoted. prioe ' ,
ltule/ConJ.it ions
BF'R
35.560
Period of application it{ax. val .
2 ) Nornal economy fare 27 .L4O
3) tublic excursion fare U.650 625C 01 APR - 3I MAR I monih
1) First clasg
Flclurn l.rn_sportrtron tfom tha pornl of turnlrounrl rhlll not b conrmlnctdpiloi lo OO01 h on thc Sundey lollowrng tha doy ot outwrrd traval. Aqtvtrtrsrng
and trlqr rlrnll rlso bo psfrilrtt6d trl tho counliy ol petnl of turrratound.
4) Apex fara (sunner) 12.90O
( winter) ro.87o
l) Group inolusive tour 8.240
Urrlese otherllise epecified in the
nrl, 5256n987/7988 and 2340), on
discounts are available :
,987 0t APR - 30 sEP 2 montha(rl Rolurn l.irlt)(,rlrl!)n from lh. potnl ol lu(rrrt)und Nhall nol ba COin'
mrncld grrr,rr trr (Ir01 h on Sundav lollowrng lhe dsy {)f outwltd trrval.(trl thrr lar,.rs orrly avarlablo lor round trtp lrtvol rn(t slopovtT! r.a pro'
hrbrted.
lcl Resr'rvaltr)n! lo. tha cntiro lournoY, ttckol rllsuo torJ futl pa\/mant ot
h.c musl ba nrade at lho gsmc lrme snd nol less than 2 t dsys prtor to com'
mencemenl ol travel PTA trgnsactions rr€ not pornrrttecl. All ae$nrystron
lequest3 musl bc clcatly rdenttfied as APEX'.
ld) Volurrtarv (:h6nqo! not porm lted and sll coupons oi i:he trcket mutl bc
clcr.lv ond()r1t.d API.X aDrl fir,,|rv{t()nl may not be chsn0txt(cf nolunrl', rr rl txrnlllfd tr(:cpt lhilt 5O"/u ol tlro trcl.tt vsluc rEY b€ d'
lowod tor crrrcollalr,rrrr rrtader up to 2l <Joyr l)eloro th€ drto of commencomcnl
of trrvol.(fl Combrnetron wrth any olh6r tErs3/6dd'onr prohrbrted ercspt tull
domectic l8res,(g) lntanls'snd childrcn'r drrcounts parmiited. ,qll other dr3counls ptohrb'
rted.(h, Notwithstandrng lny othar Rosolulion. thii frrc thrll not bG usod to
estebhsh the mrnrmum tour prce for lq inclusrve tour lnd furthermore lhr3 frtc
lend frres constructod therelrom) shall not bc ured sr t'conlrol grtco lor lltll
drrvc packagr:s
tl fhqlhts to bo dosrgnstad lor thir flrr wrll be dElormtncd in rchencc of
cach faro plrrod.(l) The nrarrmum number of prtt€ngert to bc crrrror b!/ rtch catnct thrll
not axcaod 3O passangars per tlighL
lf) Adve,t'rrno rnd 3alor only Frmittcd rtt counlry ot o.rgia.
t96t or ocr - 3r MAR
S.ma condrlronr rr Notc 7987,
7340 01 APR * 15 MAY
o1 0cr - 3r MAB
From AMS lHnnt tl ar)t)lr( nlrDn:
2 monthr
la dry.
OI A'IR - I5 MAV
0r ocr - 31 ocT
Only apphcat,le to lT gr!),;p3 ol not lcss thrn 1O rdult passo,lgar;. orcrDt tt:rl
lrom PAR thc 0r(,up crro rnall be 12 adull pcssangers. For i"avel Ai\,1S-ATX-
AMS rnd EttU -ATfi-BnL' retrJrn travel is permrtled in sub ').{tun3 '.r nr! les:r
than 5 adult passene.''i Fnturn lran3po.lation lrom ?he o(),nl ol rL' ,r'('urrcl
3htll not bg comnten< 
'-,(J t)nor to OOOI h on tho Su^,,rv lr,i . w,r,rl tlr., cl,rr ol
.JUlward !rirvcl. Stop()ver! l)ilrh'fr,trrl excent ihtt on.' (,,r,t,, "r ' tlr'',, ,t1r.(l ,rt ltrsft.$l l]ornl ol orrval rn {lree, c Tho nrnrmum lour l}frr a $}'.rll l)F lho lT t,as:.rt
lerF t)hrt tJ(| 3 pcr,roy lor th6 lolnl (lutrlron of the looil, y t'01 rn no trvcnt thflolftl pilco ih.,ll bu less thdn lhe ll basrng ta.a plls UKL 11) Advefl,r'ng d,rd
tales rnclurtrng rssuance of MCO or PlA, t.e rlro pormrtted tn th€ cocnlrv ot
lurn!round.
respective special fare rules (i.u. m:les
these d.ifferent fares +*he follol*in6
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I, Ox the basis of all fares
a) infa.nts/chil,iren faree
fnf'ante ( O 
- 
2 years)IT/o of applicable aelult fare.
Children (Z 
- 
tZ years) 5g/" of applicable ad.ult fare.
b) 'i!,rrr' cc,rr'iur: tc,r tickets
' itrc lollowing conc.trronr r.a ryaalabb fo. torn conductora worldrmda on IATA
Clrrrcrs:
For r group con.i3ting ot thc folloilng numbcr 6f
addrtron!l lour conduclot llclala may
ba itaucd
lO-14 rdult ferc peying prllGngcr. onc helf trr. tickot (5O% rcdrrctionf
15-24 adult lerc paying prssong€ra onc lrec ticket ll0Oo/r rcduction)
25-29 adult larc peying pssseng€rr onc lree tcket.nd onc hllt frrc ticd
3O-39 sduh frrc poying pssse^goro two frro trckot.
4O-44 rdulf frrc pryrng gr3ccnocrr two lrcc tich.n aod ona hall l||f
lrckGl
45-54 rdult hrc prying p.!rcng... thr.c tr.. trcl.r
55 - 59 rdult l|'. prying pilicng.ra thrco f rcc tck.tr trd o.a hrll frro
lrck.l
0O-69 rdult lrrr prying prlocng.ra four lnt ticldr
alc. {lha tour conductor 7eb.ta it cumr} ,
l.tivcl.
Thr mrnrmum numbcr of p.!!rngcr! In rclrtion to thc grrntcd concar.ba mual
ba rcach.d ova. tha cntira trip of tha tou? conductor, i.c, not stly orrr tho por.
lion trav€llcd in common.
In no crra rhall I lour conductor'r traa o, rcducad r.tc trckct irtu;d !y rn lAlA
Crr(ar lo a tour conductor, bc.rold tO thc tour conductor. dirc6qly Or indiraCtlv.
at morc than itf tacc vdua. nor rh.ll ruch tickat ba rarold.
Appliaablo Farcs and Combinationr
Thc frrc plid by thr pEssongort mry bc any fult epplceblc normrl ol rgocirl
ldult ferc hncludrng lT frrel, but not I frrc on whrch rn agcnt't, am€rant'a.
alud€nt't or group lrlv€l rcduction hil baan Orontod, arcopt $'hcn lpaciticllt
rllowcd in thG oroup t''vol reguhttons. Two chrldron for crch of whom a hrltfr-rt rt pard count !r ono pllrcngor lor thc purporc of computtng thc numbc/
of glrscngert rn tho group.
lhc tour conductor roductrcn ol 5O./. may bc rpplrod on any agghcrblc normrl
or aglclal |lrc ftncludrng lT frrol rf tha aggropfi.ta condrtr(rnt rrc fulfrllarl, ll.
Cagl at may br othorwrcl provded m lha rgp.og?uta rpacirl ha corxtri{rnafor cumultton wrlh othar radlrctpoa. raa d[cosntl concrrnrd.
the baeie of normaL economy altl publio €xcursion fares ar6 alBo availableII. On
o) Youth fares
Age 12 
- 
22 for all youth,
Qver 22 
- 
26 I'ot' fuII time stu'ients
A drco,ntr ot
- ?'clo ol th. lpplicrblc rrcrmd y<h.r onc.ury round o, circb tipfare mry be granted.
- 25.olo ol rh6.appticablc indMdurl public cxcurrkon frrc mry ba grunt
cd: provided thst(tl luch discountcd frra rhell in no 6rant bc lcu thrn thc rp,pltcabla normol Y.clasr onawry frrc,(irl ell condrtronr of thc individurl public cxcu[im frrc thrllba compltod wlth.liirl tn rhc c.r. ol circlc tirpt tha youth frrr .hrll not ba hrlth.n thc hrgheat normrl y.clrrr drrccl ori+wry tm ry4tibte-lrongornt of ofrgtn lo any an routa pornl
'Ihese diecounts are based on tire g€n€ral IATA nrles.
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flf. On the basis of only normal economy fares
d) St_udent fares
Age 12 
- 
30 for full time students. A fare appli.es of 45/o of
nornal economy one way for a single trip a.ncl 94" of one walr nornal
economy for a return tri-p. This fare is based on the carriergr
speciai regulati.ons ancl gives a better bargain than the untler c )
mentioned fares for students.
e) Reduced fares for Greek workers
$/" of normal economy one way for one way,
9U/. of no:mal economy one way for return.
f) Searnents reductions based on goverrunent order fares
I'Iithin Europe 4A/" of one way norrnal economy for a one way jourrrey.
g) School partv eroups
Groups of ten children for a return trip B5'/" of one way nornal
economy ancl for a one way trip 4215 f, of one way nomal economy'.
IV. On the basis of normal economy and first class
h) Spouse fares
5V/, ot'the full rounil trip fare for the spouse accompanying wille
or husband (maximr:.m ticket valitLity shall be ) days).
This annex only reflects the rnajor topics of the different fares and
discounts. A large nunber of nore general nrles on for instance
interlining, constluction with other fare typesr advertisingr etc.
exist which are all pubtished. uncler general rrles in the Air Passenger
Traffic guide (ePr).
